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New Evidence on Appeal 
Jeffrey C. Dobbins† 
INTRODUCTION 
Appellate review is limited, almost by definition, to consid-
eration of the factual record as established in the trial court.1 
This limitation, along with deferential standards of review on 
findings of fact, respects trial processes for presenting, evaluat-
ing, and admitting evidence, protects the fairness of the system 
to the parties, and helps ensure accuracy through the advocacy 
of counsel and the evaluation of impartial judges and juries.2 
The limitation also focuses appellate courts on their area of ex-
pertise—the resolution of questions of law—while recognizing 
the superior experience of trial courts (or, in some cases, agen-
cies) in resolving questions of fact. Consistent with this tradi-
tional understanding of appellate review, appellate courts typi-
 
†  Assistant Professor of Law, Willamette University College of Law. 
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Kaufman. Copyright © 2012 by Jeffrey C. Dobbins. 
 1. DANIEL J. MEADOR & JORDANA S. BERNSTEIN, APPELLATE COURTS IN 
THE UNITED STATES 2 (1994) (“In deciding cases, American appellate courts 
consider only those facts that were determined by the judge or jury in the trial 
court. They rarely receive additional evidence, relying instead on the ‘record’ 
made at trial.”); id. at 55 (“[A]n important characteristic of American appellate 
practice is the controlling force accorded to the record, the documents and 
formal written transcript from the trial proceedings. The general proposition, 
subject to qualifications discussed below, is that an appellate court considers 
only those facts that were established at trial and reviews only those questions 
that were properly raised and preserved in the trial court, as evidenced by the 
record.”); see also FED. R. APP. P. 10(a) (defining the record on appeal); infra 
Part I.A. 
 2. See generally MEADOR & BERNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 55–56 (discuss-
ing reasons for appellate courts not deciding issues not raised at trial); 
STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS § 3.11 cmt., at 24–25 (1994) 
(explaining general principles for appellate court review); Brianne J. Gorod, 
The Adversarial Myth: Appellate Court Extra-Record Factfinding, 61 DUKE 
L.J. 1, 3–5 (2011) (stating some problems with appellate judges looking out-
side the trial record). 
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cally reject efforts by parties to introduce on appeal “new evi-
dence” that could have been, but was not, presented below.3 
Despite this traditional understanding and plain-language 
rules that echo that understanding, there are nevertheless 
many occasions in which federal and state appellate courts will 
consider new evidence on appeal. Whether presented through 
petitions for discretionary review (alleging the importance of a 
particular case in a broader social context), amicus briefs (ex-
plaining the broad factual or technical background of a case), 
social-science-laden “Brandeis briefs,” or other mechanisms for 
supplementing the record, appellate courts often consider and 
rely upon this sort of new evidence.4 Indeed, in a world where 
volumes of information are available at the click of a mouse or 
swipe of a screen, some kinds of new evidence can easily find 
their way into a decision through a court’s own research, rather 
than via introduction by a party.5 
Much, though by no means all,6 of this new evidence falls 
into the category of legislative facts. Discussed in more detail 
below,7 these are, in essence, facts that are not directly related 
to the specific events in a particular case.8 Commentators have 
noted that judicial consideration of this kind of information is 
part and parcel of the lawmaking responsibility (or, depending 
on one’s perspective, impermissible activism) of appellate 
 
 3. See, e.g., Berger v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 295 Fed. App’x 42, 46 (6th 
Cir. 2008) (“This court does not consider non-record materials.”); Hahn v. Di-
az-Barba, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 242, 255–56 n.7 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (rejecting ef-
fort by counsel to supplement record with affidavits, presented for the first 
time on appeal, seeking to “authenticate the social network profile pages” of a 
party). 
 4. See infra Part I.B. 
 5. Consider, for instance, the articles collected in the Sept.–Oct. 2006 
volume of Judicature, which discuss the relative merits of (primarily trial) 
courts conducting their own research into the validity of scientific information. 
See 90 JUDICATURE 58–67 (2006) (collecting several articles); see also Eliza-
beth G. Thornburg, The Curious Appellate Judge: Ethical Limits on Independ-
ent Research, 28 REV. LITIG. 131, 142–74 (2008) (discussing current law and 
ethical considerations of appellate courts introducing new evidence on appeal). 
 6. See infra Part II.B.1–3. 
 7. See infra Part II.B.4. 
 8. See 2 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 10.5, 
at 937–38 (5th ed. 2010) (“Adjudicative facts usually answer the questions of 
who did what, where, when, how, why, with what motive or intent; adjudica-
tive facts are roughly the kind of facts that go to a jury in a jury 
case. . . . Legislative facts do not usually concern the immediate parties but 
are the general facts that help the tribunal decide questions of law and policy 
and discretion.”). 
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courts.9 Even that commentary, however, focuses little on the 
origin of the underlying principle, or the source and exercise of 
an appellate court’s authority to ignore that principle in order 
to consider new evidence—whether legislative fact, adjudicative 
fact, or otherwise. 
The lack of commentary on the fundamental principles is 
echoed in the written rules governing appellate court processes. 
Although those rules may define the creation and assembly of 
the particular documents that are the “record on appeal,”10 
those rules simply presume the underlying principle—that ap-
pellate review is limited to that record, and, in particular, that 
any factual information considered by the appellate court must 
have been presented to the trial court. The principle is an un-
spoken understanding, and the exceptions to it are even less 
clearly defined. The lack of definition allows appellate courts 
near-plenary control over when and whether they will consider 
at least certain types of new evidence on appeal. 
It is this largely unconstrained control over a procedural 
matter at the heart of the appellate process in which this Arti-
cle is primarily interested.11 Through an examination of when, 
where, and how appellate courts examine new evidence on ap-
 
 9. See Kenneth C. Davis, Judicial, Legislative and Administrative Law-
making: A Proposed Research Service for the Supreme Court, 71 MINN. L. REV. 
1, 7 (1986); Robert E. Keeton, Lecture, Legislative Facts and Similar Things: 
Deciding Disputed Premise Facts, 73 MINN. L. REV. 1, 21–25, 31–32 (1988); 
Ellie Margolis, Beyond Brandeis: Exploring the Uses of Non-Legal Materials in 
Appellate Briefs, 34 U.S.F. L. REV. 197, 197–98 (2000); Brenda C. See, Written 
in Stone? The Record on Appeal and the Decision-Making Process, 40 GONZ. L. 
REV. 157, 194 (2005) (“The idea that a court has a legislative function apart 
from its error-correction function has led to the development of the notion that 
appellate courts may seek all kinds of information unrelated to the adjudica-
tion of the case at hand.”); Ann Woolhandler, Rethinking the Judicial Recep-
tion of Legislative Facts, 41 VAND. L. REV. 111, 114–16 (1988). 
 10. See, e.g., FED. R. APP. P. 10(a) (defining the record on appeal to include 
particular material introduced in the trial court); CAL. APP. R. 8.120 (defining 
the “normal record on appeal” to simply be certain records from proceedings 
below). 
 11. The absence of positive law regarding the nature of record review 
places it in the company of many other fundamental principles that govern the 
day-to-day processing of cases throughout our legal system, but that merit lit-
tle discussion in the case law and only passing consideration in developing the 
rules (if any) that reflect those principles. Like the doctrines governing what 
counts as binding precedent, standards of review, or the “inherent” or “super-
visory” authority to modify those underlying principles, the doctrines that gov-
ern the record on review amount to common law rules of procedure. See Jef-
frey C. Dobbins, Structure and Precedent, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1453 (2010) 
(regarding rules of precedent). 
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peal, this Article seeks to define the principles underlying ap-
pellate record review in our court structure, and to use those 
principles to elucidate how appellate courts and judges function 
within the broader legal system, as well as how that system in-
teracts with those appellate courts. 
To that end, Part I defines the general doctrine that limits 
appellate review to the evidence generated in the prior proceed-
ings and examines the origin of, and some of the justifications 
for, that principle. Part II examines several exceptions to the 
general principle, and looks at how those exceptions intersect 
with principles of judicial notice and the consideration of legis-
lative facts. 
Finally, the Conclusion considers those exceptions collec-
tively in the context of the purpose of appellate courts in our le-
gal system. That broad examination recognizes and highlights 
the pitfalls associated with at least some uses of new evidence 
on appeal. By using such information without the prior checks 
provided by a trial court’s advocacy process, appellate courts 
risk drawing erroneous factual conclusions, or drawing conclu-
sions that, while correct at the time, do not disclose their factu-
al conclusions in a manner that permits correction (should it be 
necessary) at a later date.12 In addition, the unthinking use of 
such evidence may undermine confidence in the work of both 
appellate and trial courts, and may draw not entirely unjusti-
fied attention as a demonstration of appellate-court lawmaking 
that goes beyond the appropriate scope of decision-making for 
appellate courts. 
Nevertheless, this Article concludes, appellate courts 
should consider explicitly embracing the use of new evidence on 
appeal in certain circumstances. A review of history and these 
exceptions demonstrates that both the traditional rule and the 
exceptions to it have developed in a rather haphazard and or-
ganic manner over time; as a result, there is little in the way of 
positive law (meaning statutes, rules, or other written man-
dates) that would prohibit the use of new evidence on appeal. 
While appropriate safeguards would need to be established in 
order to avoid unfairness, this kind of appellate codification of 
the exceptions would have the salutary effect of making consid-
eration of this evidence more routine, rather than something to 
hide. By taking such an open approach, the courts will be able 
 
 12. See, e.g., Gorod, supra note 2, at 33–38 (discussing the varying reli-
ance and use of factual findings not included in the trial court record across 
different courts and cases). 
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to address the pitfalls noted above. Furthermore, by making 
the gathering and consideration of legislative facts more open, 
and pointing out that consideration of such evidence on appeal 
is not so unusual as an historical matter, courts may be able to 
avoid the worst accusations of judicial activism that are other-
wise levied when courts go beyond the record in order to decide 
socially, economically, or technically complex appeals. By focus-
ing on the legislative fact problem from a broader perspective—
that of appellate procedure generally and the regular use of 
new evidence in a variety of contexts—the concerns identified 
by a variety of commentators in this area can be alleviated. 
There is, in short, much to be gained by recognizing, ra-
tionalizing, and codifying the use of new evidence on appeal, 
and the final sections of this Article outline ways in which this 
useful goal can be accomplished. 
I.  THE PRINCIPLES & PURPOSES OF RECORD REVIEW   
A. RECORD REVIEW OF TRIAL COURT DECISIONS 
The general rule13 regarding record review on appeal is a 
familiar one: In conducting their review of a judgment below, 
appellate courts review only the information that was present-
ed in that tribunal.14 “‘An appellate court can properly consider 
only the record and facts before the district court and thus only 
those papers and exhibits filed in the district court can consti-
tute the record on appeal.’”15 As one appellate judge character-
ized the record review principle, “I can’t think of anything more 
fundamental than that.”16 
 
 13. Although appellate court rules define the scope of the record for pur-
poses of a given appellate court’s review, my reference to the general record 
review “rule” is intended (unless specifically mentioned otherwise) to refer not 
to those rules, but to the general principle or doctrine that appellate court re-
view should be limited to the trial court record. Throughout this Article, then, 
the terms record review “rule,” “doctrine” and “principle” are used inter-
changeably to refer to the same traditional principle. 
 14. Statements of the principle are legion. See, for example, those ex-
cerpted in the text. See also Ford v. Potter, 354 Fed. App’x 28, 31 (5th Cir. 
2009) (“Generally, we will not enlarge the record on appeal with evidence not 
before the district court.”); Neeb v. Lastrapes, 64 So. 3d 278, 283 (La. Ct. App. 
2011) (“An appellate court cannot review evidence that is not in the record on 
appeal and cannot receive new evidence.”).  
 15. Bath Junkie Branson, L.L.C. v. Bath Junkie, Inc., 528 F.3d 556, 559–
60 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting Huelsman v. Civic Ctr. Corp., 873 F.2d 1171, 1175 
(8th Cir. 1989)); see also FED. R. APP. P. 10(a). 
 16. THOMAS B. MARVELL, APPELLATE COURTS AND LAWYERS 160 (1978) 
(quoting an interview with an appellate judge). 
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The principle is so firmly established that courts often sug-
gest that there is something unseemly, even if not quite unethi-
cal, about an effort by counsel to introduce new evidence on  
appeal.  
The entire system of determining disputes by trial before a court rests 
on the assumption that decisions must be based on the evidence sub-
mitted to (and held admissible by) the court and nothing else. In the 
normal situation, attempts to rely on nonrecord facts in appellate 
courts are “unprofessional conduct.”17 
Thus, in rejecting an effort by appellate counsel to introduce 
new information on appeal, a California appellate court con-
cluded that it would “disregard statements in the briefs that 
are based on such improper matter.”18 The thread of moral dis-
approval is echoed in the reluctance of judges to mention their 
use of new evidence on appeal,19 and it suggests the degree to 
which this fundamental principle of appellate practice governs 
the behavior of participants within it.20 
The record review principle does not stand alone; it is, in a 
sense, a specialized form of the rule limiting appellate court 
consideration to arguments that were preserved below. Thus, 
not only is “determination of facts . . . the responsibility of the 
trial court, [with] the appellate court being responsible only for 
ascertaining that a factual conclusion is reasonably supported 
by the evidence” presented below, but “an appellate court 
should consider only those contentions that were initially made 
in the trial court. Observance of this rule obliges the parties to 
submit their cases in full in the trial court.”21 As is discussed 
 
 17. ROBERT L. STERN, APPELLATE PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 
§ 10.12, at 276 (2d ed. 1989) (noting also “[t]hat parties and courts, including 
appellate courts, are limited to reliance upon facts in the record is an accepted 
principle which, like most principles, is generally true but not invariably”). 
 18. Truong v. Nguyen, 67 Cal. Rptr. 3d 675, 688 (Cal Ct. App. 2007) (em-
phasis added). 
 19. See MARVELL, supra note 16, at 165 (“[W]ritten opinions are of no 
help, since judges would not be expected to announce that they were influ-
enced by such facts.”); Kenneth C. Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence 
in the Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 406 (1942) (“Probably a 
systematic investigation of this subject would be unfruitful . . . for the general 
custom of judges has been to make no mention in formal opinions of extra-
record sources of information.”). 
 20. But see MARVELL, supra note 16, at 165–66 (noting exceptions to the 
general principle (discussed infra) and suggesting that courts often had no 
particular problem with counsel referencing facts outside of the record). 
 21. STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS, supra note 2. 
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further below, the principles of record review and preservation 
arise out of the same historical provenance.22 
Commentators describing the limitation on new evidence 
on appeal list a number of rationales for the principle. These 
justifications generally boil down to considerations of economy 
and fairness. Under the record review rule, primary responsi-
bility for factual development is left to the trial court, with its 
accompanying rules of evidence and established processes for 
capturing testimony and documentary evidence; that allocation 
of responsibility allows an efficient division of labor between 
the factually oriented trial courts and law-oriented appellate 
courts.23 Fairness, on the other hand, is enhanced by ensuring 
that information is initially submitted within the context of the 
daily adversarial give-and-take of trial court process, allowing 
parties who object to certain evidence to be able to challenge it 
via well-established mechanisms for presenting and assessing 
evidence.24 Other principles aided by the record rule include ac-
curacy (a principle related to fairness, since accuracy helps to 
ensure that all facts would be first tested, and relevance de-
termined by, a trial court judge)25 and finality (a principle re-
lated to economy, since finality limits the ability of parties to 
re-argue cases multiple times).26 
The principle regarding record review is so well-ingrained 
in our system that there is little in the way of criticism. In most 
cases, challenges are only indirect—a commentator may note, 
 
 22. There is another parallel between the principles of record review and 
preservation: like the former, there is very little that regulates the latter. “The 
United States Supreme Court has declined to announce any guidelines as to 
when appellate courts should consider arguments raised for the first time on 
appeal, rather than in the trial court.” DANIEL J. MEADOR ET AL., APPELLATE 
COURTS: STRUCTURES, FUNCTIONS, PROCESSES AND PERSONNEL 201 (2d ed. 
2006); see also infra text accompanying notes 105–06. For a recent discussion 
of the preservation rule and a fine review of exceptions to it, see Joan Stein-
man, Appellate Courts as First Responders: The Constitutionality and Proprie-
ty of Appellate Courts’ Resolving Issues in the First Instance, 87 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1911455. 
 23. See, e.g., MARVELL, supra note 16; STANDARDS RELATING TO APPEL-
LATE COURTS, supra note 2. 
 24. See, e.g., MARVELL, supra note 16, at 161 (articulating fairness argu-
ment in favor of record review rule); See, supra note 9, at 184–85 (noting that 
the purpose of Canon Three of the Model Code of Judicial Ethics, which limits 
the ability of courts to consider ex parte communication, is “motivated by the 
concern for fairness and its appearance”); see also Gorod, supra note 2, at 3–5, 
21–25 (discussing adversarial premise of American court system). 
 25. MEADOR & BERNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 56. 
 26. Id. 
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for instance, that the principle leads to a risk of injustice asso-
ciated with a lack of information about what may have actually 
occurred in a given case—but that cost is generally seen as jus-
tified in light of the efficiency and fairness benefits associated 
with the rule. That said, there have been some concentrated 
criticisms of the record review rule, most notably the argu-
ments, discussed in the following Section, made by Harvard 
Law Dean Roscoe Pound in the 1930s and 40s. 
B. THE ORIGIN OF, AND CHALLENGES TO, THE RECORD REVIEW 
PRINCIPLE 
Given the near-universal acceptance of the principle limit-
ing appellate review to the factual record below, it is perhaps 
not surprising that the general principle is so rarely discussed 
or noted. While rules of court define the scope of the record on 
review, there is little analysis regarding the rationale for the 
rule, its underlying substance, or the wisdom of retaining it. 
The principle has been a part of American legal practice for so 
long that it seems a fundamental point.  
There have been some exceptions. In his writings before 
World War II, Roscoe Pound criticized excessive attention to 
the record as “record worship.”27 Pound’s concern was much 
broader than the specific form of the factual record on appeal.28 
Nevertheless, he believed that an excessive focus on the rec-
ord—and errors on the face of the record—led courts to ignore 
the appropriate outcome “had it been possible to get the real 
case before the [reviewing] court.”29 One treatment for that 
problem, he concluded, would be to allow appellate courts to 
consider new evidence on appeal.30 
In suggesting an abandonment of the traditional approach, 
Pound found support in his historical conclusions that the rec-
ord review doctrine was “an anachronism.”31 The doctrine was, 
in essence, an historical accident, rather than a consciously de-
 
 27. See ROSCOE POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES passim 
(1941) [hereinafter POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE]; ROSCOE POUND, CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 161 (1930) [hereinafter POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE] 
(“[Record worship is] an excessive regard for the formal record at the expense 
of the case, a strict scrutiny of that record for ‘errors of law’ at the expense of 
scrutiny of the case to insure the consonance of the result to the demands of 
substantive law.”). 
 28. POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE, supra note 27, at 35, 377–93. 
 29. Id. at 35. 
 30. Id. at 387–88.  
 31. Id. at 387. 
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veloped principle supported by a rational division of judicial  
responsibilities.32 
As Pound noted, even the English courts of review would 
occasionally permit consideration of new evidence on appeal.33 
Any knee-jerk reaction against allowing such a consideration 
was, in his view, a reactionary and unnecessary reliance on 
dust-bound rules of procedure that developed out of an alto-
gether different—and much stricter—legal system.34 
Pound’s understanding of the history of the record review 
rule is echoed in more recent writings. As Daniel Meador & 
Jordana Bernstein note, the principle finds its origin 
in the writ of error in the English common-law courts. At common law 
there was no concept of an appeal like that in the modern-day United 
States. Instead, a party against whom a judgment had been rendered 
at nisi prius could seek a writ of error from the court at Westminster, 
assigning specified errors of law committed by the trial judge. The 
proceeding, in effect, made the trial judge a defendant. Under that 
procedure the judge could not have been guilty of error unless a mat-
ter had been presented to him and he had ruled on it.35 
The term “appeal,” on the other hand, arose, at least in 
part, out of the courts of equity and emphasized the effort to 
reach the “right” decision, rather than adherence to the hide-
bound principles of preservation and record review.36 Over 
time, the principles of review inherent in the equity courts 
merged with the much stricter procedural obligations associat-
ed with the law courts’ writ of error and gave rise to our mod-
ern appellate process along with the obligations regarding 
preservation and record review.37  
It is hard to know how far Pound would press his reform 
proposals today. The appellate courts are, as has been pointed 
out repeatedly since at least the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
 
 32. Id.; see also id. at 38–320 (discussing historical development of appel-
late processes); See, supra note 9, at 158–68 (sketching a history of record de-
velopment in appellate procedure). 
 33. POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE, supra note 27, at 387–88. 
 34. Id. at 388. 
 35. MEADOR & BERNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 58. 
 36. Id. at 58–59; see also Mary Sarah Bilder, The Origin of the Appeal in 
America, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 913, 915, 926–27 (1997). Bilder points out that the 
history of the “appeal” in American law is rooted in sources much broader than 
the equity courts considered by Pound. At the same time, however, she does 
not separately seek to identify a source for the now-dominant record review 
rule beyond that identified by Pound: the procedures associated with the 
common law writ of error. 
 37. MEADOR & BERNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 55–59. 
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faced with a “crisis of volume.”38 It seems difficult to imagine 
allowing appellate courts to regularly consider new evidence—
or to create mechanisms for doing so—when they have enough 
trouble processing cases under the existing and far stricter rec-
ord review principle. 
Nevertheless, several points can be drawn from Pound’s 
analysis. First, the historical examination presented by him 
and repeated by subsequent scholars demonstrates that the 
record review rule is rooted, along with its parallel preservation 
requirement, more in vestiges of the historical relationships be-
tween the English courts, rather than a conscious evaluation of 
the role of appellate courts within our legal system.  
Second, the organic development of the principle limiting 
the scope of appellate review to the trial court record explains 
much about why the principle is so rarely discussed. It is part 
of our fundamental understanding of the relationship between 
appellate and trial courts. While that relationship has changed 
somewhat over the years, it is rare that it has done so with an 
exhaustive examination into this kind of fundamental relation-
ship (particularly in light of the crowded dockets at all levels). 
Third, in light of that historical development, there is very 
little in positive law that requires the rule to remain the same. 
Though unusual and creative, Pound’s modest proposal to per-
mit appellate courts to consider new evidence was not only 
permissible, but entirely consistent with his effort to develop a 
more effective appellate process.39 To the degree that alterna-
tives to the record review rule exist, it is largely historical con-
vention, rather than considered analysis, that prevents those 
alternatives from being adopted. 
Finally, Pound’s prescription for change suggests that we 
should consider thinking about the new evidence exceptions to 
the general principle in a different light. Rather than consider 
the exceptions discussed in Part II as bizarre deviations from 
existing practice, they can instead be conceived of as small for-
ays into a broader examination of how the record review rule 
works—and how it should work—in the broader appellate sys-
 
 38. Bert I. Huang, Lightened Scrutiny, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1112 n.9 
(2011) (noting that the phrase “crisis of volume” regarding the appellate courts 
came into common usage in the early 1970s); see also, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, 
Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the Function of Re-
view and the National Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 542, 554 (1969); Huang, supra, 
at 1112–13 & nn.7–12. 
 39. See POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE, supra note 27, at 377–93 (de-
scribing the full scope of his proposals). 
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tem. There are systemic alternatives to record review, in other 
words, that should make us think more critically of the way 
that record review works in our current system. 
Meador and Bernstein note that there are some systems in 
which this kind of systemic alternative is employed. In the 
“German appellate courts known as Oberlandesgerichte and in 
the English Court of Appeal, Criminal Division,” the appellate 
courts focus their review on equitable outcomes, even if record 
review rules are cast aside in the process.40 
Furthermore, they point out, some states permit this kind 
of review as well: “California statutes, for example, authorize 
the appellate court to receive new evidence and to make factual 
determinations different from those made by the trial court. 
That authority, however, is exercised sparingly.”41 Noting 
docket volume concerns, they conclude that the limited use of 
this power is wise: “Although there may be some attraction to 
that role by appellate courts striving to serve the interests of 
justice in each case, it would raise serious questions as to the 
most appropriate allocation of judicial functions and re-
sources.”42 
C. NEW EVIDENCE IN REVIEWING COURTS AND THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 
Although the primary focus of this Article is on the role of 
new evidence in appellate review of trial court proceedings, the 
general rule also applies in judicial review of administrative 
agency decisions. As noted below, there are important differ-
ences between the record review rule in the regular judicial 
context and that in the administrative law context. Neverthe-
less, because some of the most significant observations regard-
ing the use of extra-record evidence were initially offered as 
commentary on administrative proceedings,43 and because the 
exceptions to the general rule are quite common in administra-
tive law cases, the administrative law principle is worth noting 
 
 40. MEADOR & BERNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 59. 
 41. Id.; see also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 909 (West 2009) (“In all cases 
where trial by jury is not a matter of right . . . the reviewing court may make 
factual determinations contrary to or in addition to those made by the trial 
court . . . . The reviewing court may . . . take additional evidence of or concern-
ing facts occurring at any time prior to the decision of the appeal.”); In re Zeth 
S., 73 P.3d 541, 547 (Cal. 2003) (noting “exceptional circumstances” necessary 
before appellate court would consider new evidence on appeal under § 909). 
 42. MEADOR & BERNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 59.  
 43. See Davis, supra note 19; see also Gorod, supra note 2, at 51–52. 
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here. 
Under the federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA), as 
interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court, as well as under most 
state-level APAs, judicial review of administrative action is lim-
ited to the factual record as developed by the agency.44 “It is 
black letter law that, except in the rare case, review in federal 
court must be based on the record before the agency and, hence, 
a reviewing court may not go outside the administrative rec-
ord.”45 Whether reviewing agency action under the federal APA 
or under most state APAs, the general rule is that the “appel-
late” court (sometimes the trial court, if a petition is initially 
filed there, rather than the court of appeals) is limited to re-
viewing the agency decision in the context of the factual record 
considered and assembled by the agency.46 
Although there are significant parallels between appellate 
review of agency decisions and the review of judicial decisions, 
those situations are not identical. First, the record review rule 
in the administrative context is, at least in part, an outgrowth 
of the oft-heated discussion regarding the proper role of admin-
istrative agencies. That discussion between politicians, admin-
istrators, attorneys, and academics, rather than an organic 
outgrowth of common law, led to the federal,47 and later, the 
state, APAs.48 To that degree, then, the administrative record 
review rule is the product of a different process than the devel-
opment of the judicial rule.  
Second, the record itself, particularly in informal rulemak-
 
 44. See MICHAEL ASIMOW & RONALD LEVIN, STATE AND FEDERAL ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE LAW 578–80 (3d ed. 2009) (explaining that the federal rule is “firm-
ly established,” while the rule in states is more mixed, with some states follow-
ing the “open record” rule); PIERCE, supra note 8, § 11.6. 
 45. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & CHARLES H. KOCH, FEDERAL PRACTICE & 
PROCEDURE: JUDICIAL REVIEW § 8306, at 73 (2006). 
 46. See Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973) (“[T]he focal point for judi-
cial review should be the administrative record already in existence, not some 
new record made initially in the reviewing court.”); Citizens to Preserve Over-
ton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419–20 (1971). 
 47. For a history of the federal Administrative Procedure Act, see George 
Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges 
from New Deal Politics, 90 N.W. U. L. REV. 1557 (1996); see also PIERCE, supra 
note 8, § 1.4. 
 48. As commentators have pointed out, the strictness of the administra-
tive record requirement under at least the federal APA is not entirely clear 
from the plain language of the APA. That has not stopped courts from impos-
ing a strict record review rule on reviewing courts, however; it may be that 
this is due in part to the influence of the traditional judicial record review 
rule. 
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ing and adjudication, may be much more poorly defined than is 
true for trial court records, which usually arise out of a much 
more formalized process.49 Finally, the administrative law rec-
ord review principle does not apply solely within the judiciary, 
but in cases where the decision under review comes from an ex-
ecutive agency. That inter-branch relationship means that the 
record review rule in the administrative context is at least part-
ly motivated by considerations of separation of powers that are 
not present when review is occurring entirely within the judi-
cial branch.50 
There are both global and narrow exceptions to the general 
rule. While most states and federal agencies work under a 
“closed record” rule like that for appeals from trial courts, there 
are some states in which an “open record” principle applies.51 
In these states, “a court may consider new evidence regarding 
‘any material fact’” not otherwise required to be generated on 
the record.52 And even in the federal closed record system, 
courts have set forth specific rules regarding when evidence 
outside the scope of the agency-designated record can be con-
sidered.53 
When compared to the management of exceptions to the 
judicial record review rule, the discussion and diversity of 
views regarding this principle in the administrative context is 
notable. This is due in part to both the statutory source of the 
 
 49. See James N. Saul, Overly Restrictive Administrative Records and the 
Frustration of Judicial Review, 38 ENVTL. L. 1301, 1313–14 (2008) (discussing 
the range of possible ways in which the scope of the administrative record 
could be established). 
 50. Daniel J. Rohlf, Avoiding the ‘Bare Record’: Safeguarding Meaningful 
Judicial Review of Federal Agency Actions, 35 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 575, 588 
(2009) (citing Asarco, Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 616 F.2d 1153, 1160 
(9th Cir. 1980)) (noting that courts “explain in terms of separation of powers 
their view of the APA as placing limitations on courts’ use of information out-
side the agency’s ‘whole record’”). 
 51. ASIMOW & LEVIN, supra note 44, at 579–80. 
 52. Id. (citing MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT § 5-114(a)(3) (1981); 
Lake Sunapee Protective Ass’n v. N.H. Wetlands Bd., 574 A.2d 1368, 1373 
(N.H. 1990)). Even closed record states have exceptions to the general rule. 
Consider, for instance, Norden v. Oregon Water Resources Department, 996 
P.2d 958, 961–63 (Or. 2000) (concluding that under the Oregon APA, parties 
seeking review of an order in “other than a contested case” may present addi-
tional evidence to the trial court before that court determines whether the or-
der was supported by substantial evidence). 
 53. See Lands Council v. Powell, Reg’l Forester of Region One, 395 F.3d 
1019, 1030 (9th Cir. 2005) (new evidence permitted to determine if agency has 
considered all relevant factors, relied on documents not on record, or acted in 
bad faith, or to explain difficult technical matters). 
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administrative rule and the history of discussions regarding the 
appropriate nature of administrative processes. It is in the 
open nature of the discussion regarding the administrative rule 
that the contrast is most dramatic. The scope of the exceptions 
to the rule is, if anything, broader in the appellate context than 
in the administrative one. It is to those exceptions that we now 
turn. 
II.  THE EXCEPTIONS: CONSIDERING NEW EVIDENCE 
ON APPEAL   
The general rule discussed in Part I is familiar territory to 
those who have even a basic familiarity with appellate courts 
and the appellate process. There are, however, many situations 
in which appellate courts stray from black letter procedure and 
permit (or even invite) consideration of new evidence on appeal. 
While the most significant categories are discussed below, there 
are certainly more examples than those mentioned specifically 
in the text and footnotes. After all, “the general custom of judg-
es has been to make no mention in formal opinions of extra-
record sources of information.”54 In considering these excep-
tions to the record review rule, then, “[w]ritten opinions are of 
no help, since judges would not be expected to announce that 
they were influenced by” new evidence on appeal.55 It is never-
theless possible to broadly characterize the mechanisms that 
appellate courts have used to blaze their own trail through the 
traditional principle. 
A. WHAT IS “NEW EVIDENCE” ON APPEAL? 
What is “new evidence” for purposes of this Article? The 
basic definitions provide a starting point. First, evidence is 
“[s]omething (including testimony, documents and tangible ob-
jects) that tends to prove or disprove the existence of an alleged 
fact.”56 In turn, a fact is “[s]omething that actually exists; an 
aspect of reality.”57 For purposes of this piece, new evidence is 
 
 54. Davis, supra note 19. 
 55. MARVELL, supra note 16, at 165; see also Gorod, supra note 2, at 50–53 
(noting “existential crisis” associated with conceding that appellate courts 
make law, and that they consider new legislative facts in doing so). 
 56. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 635 (9th ed. 2009). 
 57. Id. at 669. While a rich jurisprudential and philosophical literature 
delves into the question of whether even adjudicative facts presented at trial 
have any hope of revealing “reality,” see generally, e.g., Charles Nesson, The 
Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 
HARV. L. REV. 1357 (1985), this Article focuses on the problem of evidence as 
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information regarding “an aspect of reality” that was not pre-
sented to the trial court, but that is presented to the appellate 
court. 
So defined, there are some categories of new evidence that 
are intentionally excluded from the discussion below. The focus 
of this Article is on evidence that could have been but was not 
submitted to the trial court. This focus therefore excludes in-
formation regarding facts that may have changed in the period 
between the trial court’s judgment and the appellate court’s 
consideration; for instance, allegations that a case is moot on 
appeal will often require an appellate court to consider what is 
technically new evidence. Because the trial court could never 
have considered that information, however, such evidence pre-
sents a different problem than is true for information that 
could have been, but was not presented to the trial court.58 
While there is some new evidence that is truly new—in the 
sense that it could not have been presented to the trial court 
because it was unavailable for legitimate reasons59—the prob-
lem of changed evidence is not the focus of this Article.60 
Also excluded from consideration below is new evidence as 
it is introduced into the record through Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 60(b)(2) and state-level equivalents.61 When a party 
 
managed by attorneys, courts, and parties. 
 58. See, e.g., Clark v. K-Mart Corp., 979 F.2d 965, 967 (3d Cir. 1992) (en 
banc) (despite normal rule that the appellate court is “limited in our review to 
those facts developed in the district court . . . . because mootness is a jurisdic-
tional issue, we may receive facts relevant to that issue; otherwise there would 
be no way to find out if an appeal has become moot”); see also Rio Grande Sil-
very Minnow v. Bureau of Reclamation, 601 F.3d 1096, 1110 n.11 (10th Cir. 
2010) (rejecting party’s effort to supplement the record in order to challenge a 
finding of mootness because their argument (and evidence) was available to 
them, but not made, at the trial court level). But see Brody v. Spang, 957 F.2d 
1108, 1114 (3d Cir. 1992) (supplementing record with information disproving 
mootness where parties stipulated to the truth of the matter).  
 59. See generally Stuart M. Benjamin, Stepping into the Same River 
Twice: Rapidly Changing Facts and the Appellate Process, 78 TEX. L. REV. 269, 
272 (1999) (discussing “the various choices available to appellate courts faced 
with potentially outdated factual findings from a trial court,” including prob-
lems of mootness as well as changed facts in cases involving injunctions). 
 60. Because mootness raises jurisdictional issues, allowing new evidence 
to be considered regarding mootness might be seen as a subset of those cases 
that permit appellate courts to consider new evidence regarding their jurisdic-
tion over the case. That broader point is discussed further infra. 
 61. See FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b) (discussing circumstances in which a judg-
ment may be vacated in order to address “newly discovered evidence that, with 
reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new 
trial”); OR. R. CIV. P. 71B(1)(b) (same). This type of evidence overlaps, but is 
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seeks relief from judgment in light of new evidence, the result-
ing trial court ruling is generally reviewed on appeal for abuse 
of discretion on whether the relief was properly granted (or 
not). This is not new evidence on appeal; rather, it is evidence 
that is now in the trial court’s record. The focus of this Article 
is the situation where an appellate court considers and relies 
upon new evidence in order to make its own determinations re-
garding a question presented on appeal—a situation that is 
largely unmediated by the rules of appellate procedure.  
Finally, new evidence for purposes of this Article does not 
include evidence that was considered and relied upon by the 
trial court, but was inadvertently left out of the formal record 
below (because, for instance, the parties failed to either have 
the evidence admitted or at least proffer the information). 
While there are some exceptions (as noted infra), the general 
understanding is that rules permitting supplementation of the 
record on appeal are intended to “allow[] amendment of the 
record on appeal only to correct inadvertent omissions, not to 
introduce new evidence.”62 Such evidence is not, at least in the 
sense of this Article, truly new because it was reviewed in the 
trial court. 
If a party does not seek supplementation of the record, but 
the trial court decision nevertheless reveals information about 
facts considered but not formally part of the record, an appel-
late court may choose to review the information revealed by the 
trial court rulings without sidestepping the record review rule. 
In Kimball Glassco Residential Center, Inc. v. Shanks,63 for in-
stance, the Mississippi Supreme Court struck from the excerpts 
of record on appeal copies of correspondence that were not 
made part of the official record in the case.64 The Mississippi 
Supreme Court agreed, based on discussion in the trial court 
order, that the trial court had considered the correspondence, 
but the parties did not seek to supplement the record and so 
the copies of the correspondence were struck. Notably, however, 
the court still considered the correspondence to the degree that 
its content was revealed in the trial court order.65 
 
not coextensive with, “changed” evidence on appeal. For instance, changed 
facts that cause an appeal to become moot are generally not addressed via 
Rule 60(b). 
 62. In re Application of Adan, 437 F.3d 381, 388 n.3 (3d Cir. 2006); see al-
so FED. R. APP. P. 10(e)(2).  
 63. 64 So. 3d 941 (Miss. 2011). 
 64. Id. at 945 n.3. 
 65. Id. This “back door” mechanism allowing review of information that 
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In the end, when an appellate court considers information 
relied upon by the trial court (whether that information was 
part of the formal trial court record or not),66 the result is ap-
pellate court review of the same information presented to the 
trial court, and this Article does not count it as new evidence on  
appeal. 
B. APPELLATE COURT CONSIDERATION OF NEW EVIDENCE ON 
APPEAL 
The exceptions to the traditional rule barring record review 
can be characterized both by the type of new evidence being 
considered, and by the method through which courts access 
that evidence. The following look at appellate consideration of 
new evidence on appeal is primarily arranged by method, 
which permits something of a chronological evaluation of the 
circumstances in which this information may be considered.67 
Part II.B.4 deviates somewhat from this method-based list, fo-
cusing on the important distinction between adjudicative and 
legislative facts. Adjudicative facts are specific to the parties 
 
was presented to, but not made part of the formal record of, the trial court 
proceeding, seems to be a particularly good example of the unnecessarily stark 
“record worship” that Pound so vocally criticized. See POUND, CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE, supra note 27. Where all parties agree that the information was re-
viewed and relied upon by the trial court, even if the particular evidence was 
not formally submitted, it should be an easy case for supplementing the record 
on appeal. For that reason, Kimball-Glassco is by no means the last word on 
treatment of this kind of extra-record evidence. More typical is the outcome in 
United States v. Barrow, 118 F.3d 482, 487 (6th Cir. 1997), in which the court 
of appeals allowed the record on appeal to be supplemented with segments of 
depositions that “had been submitted to and considered by the [district] court” 
but not added to the formal record. Id. Similarly, in Ross v. Kemp, the Elev-
enth Circuit allowed deposition material to be admitted to the record under 
Rule 10(e) because (1) it had been considered at trial, and (2) both parties had 
a valid belief that, under procedural rules in place at the time, the court clerk 
would automatically file the depositions. 785 F.2d 1467, 1471 (11th Cir. 1986). 
 66. See FED. R. APP. P. 10(e). 
 67. By focusing on the procedural mechanisms by which new evidence is 
introduced to the appellate courts, I hope to articulate the full range of cir-
cumstances by which appellate courts accept (or generate) new evidence on 
appeal. I do not explicitly theorize the circumstances in which new evidence 
should or should not be considered, focusing instead on the counterintuitive 
fact that it is. 
Although done in the context of new arguments on appeal, Joan Steinman 
has begun to articulate important theoretical grounds upon which this kind of 
“new” information is appropriately considered by appellate courts. See Stein-
man, supra note 22 (manuscript at 5, 32–38, 44–66). More remains to be done 
in extending these considerations into the context of new evidence on appeal. 
My thanks to Professor Steinman for her insights on this point. 
 2012] NEW EVIDENCE ON APPEAL 2033 
 
and circumstances connected with a particular case, while leg-
islative facts involve conclusions about policy, technology, and 
economics that may have had no reason to be discussed or even 
anticipated at trial. As these examples demonstrate, appellate 
courts regularly permit, and occasionally even invite, consider-
ation of new evidence on appeal.  
1. Simple Agreement 
One of the most common ways in which new information is 
conveyed to appellate courts is through the normal process of 
communication with the appellate court: through briefs and 
oral argument.68 Although these are, of course, formal modes of 
communication, the process by which this information enters 
the record is quite informal; it amounts to the quiet willingness 
of parties and the court to consider specific facts that are help-
ful to the court’s analysis in the case, even if they fall outside 
the scope of the formal lower court record.69 Appellate courts 
take great advantage of this largely uncontrolled mechanism.70 
As Thomas B. Marvell’s study of appellate processes showed, a 
significant majority of appellate briefs and arguments, appar-
ently relying on these principles, include discussions about 
facts that are outside the scope of the record below.71  
While this kind of sub silentio consideration of new evi-
dence on appeal is common, it is rarely commented upon. As 
Marvell notes, “written opinions are of no help, since judges 
would not be expected to announce that they were influenced 
by such facts.”72 Typically, such evidence is simply accepted 
without comment.73 In the end, “appellate judges have and use 
 
 68. See MARVELL, supra note 16, at 70. 
 69. See id. at 162–67. 
 70. See id.  
 71. Id. at 164–65 (noting that “counsel and the court quite often violated” 
the record review rule since, out of the 112 appeals studied, “attorneys men-
tioned facts clearly outside the record in the great majority” of the appeals and 
the courts regularly asked for (and received) information that was outside the 
scope of the trial court record). 
 72. Id. at 165. 
 73. Judicial notice is not the answer. See FED. R. EVID. 201; discussion 
infra Part II.B.4. As Marvell notes, much of this “new evidence”—whether 
presented by the parties or considered sua sponte by the courts—is not an ap-
propriate subject for judicial notice. See MARVELL, supra note 16, at 163 
(“Facts used in . . . situations [where the court reads between the lines of the 
record] certainly do not fall within the allowable limits of judicial notice.”); see 
also id. at 161 (noting that awareness of judicial notice does not mean that 
such restrictions are followed). 
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considerable discretion as to whether they will use or ignore 
supporting case facts not in the record and falling outside the 
judicial notice restrictions.”74 
Courts and commentators will occasionally suggest that 
stipulation by the parties can permit a court to consider evi-
dence that was not before the trial court. Thus, “the appellate 
court has discretion to consider, in the interest of justice, a fact 
not in the record that is conveyed by counsel during oral argu-
ment and not disputed by opposing counsel.”75 Furthermore, “a 
statement of fact asserted in one party’s brief and conceded as 
true in the opposing party’s brief may be considered as though 
it appears in the record.”76 In essence, “if everyone agrees, and 
we want to consider it, we will.” On the other hand, there is 
plenty of case law supporting the traditional rule, under which 
appellate courts will refuse to consider supplemental evidence 
on appeal even when the parties are willing to stipulate to its 
accuracy and to its inclusion in the appellate record.77 This per-
spective is entirely consistent with at least one of the rationales 
behind the traditional record review rule: that principles of 
economy justify requiring the trial court, not the court of ap-
peals, to have the first shot at incorporating information into 
the outcome of the case.78  
Few courts attempt to reconcile these strains of analysis.79 
Almost none offer any coherent discussion of the justification 
for allowing new evidence in this kind of situation, or for the 
contrary cases, declining to consider it.80 The closest some 
courts come to offering specific justification for considering new 
 
 74. MARVELL, supra note 16, at 162. 
 75. MEADOR & BERNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 55–56. 
 76. In re Trust of Nitsche, 46 S.W.3d 682, 684 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) (citing 
Robinson v. Empiregas, Inc. of Hartville, 906 S.W.2d 829, 835 n.6 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1995)). 
 77. See, e.g., Shahar v. Bowers, 120 F.3d 211, 213 n.4, 214 (11th Cir. 1997) 
(refusing to permit the parties to supplement the record on appeal, even 
though the parties stipulated to the new evidence, and rejecting the applica-
tion of judicial notice to the stipulated facts); S&E Shipping Corp. v. Chesa-
peake & Ohio Ry. Co., 678 F.2d 636, 641 (6th Cir. 1982) (holding that the dis-
trict court may not supplement the record with stipulated information that 
was not submitted and considered at trial); Panaview Door & Window Co. v. 
Reynolds Metals Co., 255 F.2d 920, 922 (9th Cir. 1958) (“Matters which were 
not before the trial court will be stricken on motion, even if they have been in-
cluded in the record on appeal by stipulation.”). 
 78. See United States v. Barrow, 118 F.3d 482, 487 (6th Cir. 1997). 
 79. See MARVELL, supra note 16, at 162 (documenting the uncertainty in 
this area of law). 
 80. See id.  
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evidence in this kind of situation is their reliance, discussed in 
the next Section, on rules regarding supplementation of the 
record and, more importantly, the inherent power of appellate 
courts.81 
2. Supplementing the Record and the Inherent Powers of the 
Appellate Court 
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(e), as well as simi-
lar state law rules governing the supplementation of the record, 
permit parties to correct “errors or omissions” in the trial court 
record.82 The traditional application of this rule is to ensure 
that the appellate court considers the same information that 
the trial court considers, even if the formal record from the trial 
court fails to accurately reflect what the trial court knew about 
the case.83 As noted in the prior Sections, if material was con-
sidered by the trial court, the appellate court may, under these 
rules, consider it as part of a “corrected” appellate record.84 
Consistent with the traditional record review rule, however, the 
standard interpretation of the rules holds that fairness and fi-
nality principles prevent parties from supplementing the record 
with material that was neither filed with the trial court nor 
brought to that court’s attention.85 
As one practitioner noted, however, “[i]n addition to correc-
tion of the record, the court of appeals has the authority to 
permit supplementation of the record.”86 This authority “either 
is implicit in Rule 10(e) . . . or is part of the court’s inherent eq-
uitable powers.”87 
 
 81. See infra note 87 and accompanying text. 
 82. See S&E Shipping Corp., 678 F.2d at 641. 
 83. See MARVELL, supra note 16. 
 84. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.  
 85. See Henn v. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 819 F.2d 824, 831 (7th Cir. 1987); 
S&E Shipping Corp., 678 F.2d at 641 (“The purpose of . . . [Rule 10(e)] is to 
allow the district court to correct omissions from or misstatements in the rec-
ord for appeal, not to introduce new evidence in the court of appeals.”); United 
States ex rel. Kellogg v. McBee, 452 F.2d 134, 137 (7th Cir. 1971). 
 86. Steven Richman, Record on Appeal and the Joint Appendix, in A 
PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO APPELLATE ADVOCACY 169, 174 (Anne Marie Lofaso 
ed., 2010) (emphasis added). 
 87. Id.; see also 16A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION & RELATED MATTERS § 3956.4 (4th ed. 2008) 
(“In special circumstances, a court of appeals may supplement the record to 
add material not presented to the district court, though this is rare enough 
that many of the decisions noting the court’s power to do so go on to say that 
the power will not be exercised under the circumstances of the case. Because 
Rule 10 does not in its terms provide for such supplementation, some courts 
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The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has a 
particularly rich line of cases to this effect. Consider, for in-
stance, the court’s management of new evidence on appeal in 
Schwartz v. Million Air, Inc.,88 a tort action involving an air-
plane crash in Ecuador. Some of the plaintiffs were on the 
ground at the time of the crash and suffered serious injuries.89 
It was later discovered, however, that some of the many plain-
tiffs had falsified their medical records and that they had, in 
fact, not been injured in the crash.90 The defendant moved to 
dismiss the claims and to award fees and costs, and the district 
court granted the motion.91 
On appeal, the remaining victims and their attorneys 
“moved to supplement the record to include exhibits from the 
case files of their former clients. These exhibits include[d] pho-
tocopies of the altered medical records.”92 The court decided to 
permit the evidence: 
We rarely supplement the record to include material that was not be-
fore the district court, but we have the equitable power to do so if it is 
in the interests of justice. We decide on a case-by-case basis whether 
an appellate record should be supplemented. Even when the added 
material will not conclusively resolve an issue on appeal, we may al-
low supplementation in the aid of making an informed decision.93 
The court also permitted the parties to supplement the record 
with substitute versions of documents that had been submitted 
at trial.94 The trial copies were not particularly clear, while the 
ones submitted in the motion to supplement were “clearer  
copies.”95 
Overall, the court concluded, the additional evidence—the 
new evidence on appeal—provided the court “with a better un-
derstanding of the information Appellants possessed at the 
time these cases were pending.”96 The court therefore granted 
the motion to supplement.97 
 
state that it constitutes an exercise of inherent power.”).  
 88. 341 F.3d 1220, 1223–26 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 89. Id. at 1223. 
 90. Id. at 1223–24. 
 91. Id. at 1224. 
 92. Id. at 1225 n.4. 
 93. Id. (citing CSX Transp., Inc. v. City of Garden City, 235 F.3d 1325, 
1330 (11th Cir. 2000); Cabalceta v. Standard Fruit Co., 883 F.2d 1553, 1555 
(11th Cir. 1989)). 
 94. Id.  
 95. Id.  
 96. Id.  
 97. Id. 
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For those familiar with the appellate process and the rec-
ord review rule, the entire exercise is rather shocking. The rule 
is that information not presented in the trial court is outside 
the record on appeal, regardless of whether new information 
might provide a better understanding.98 Yet, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit was more than willing to consider the information.99 
In order to justify its willingness to go beyond the trial 
court record, the Eleventh Circuit relies primarily on what it 
characterizes as its “inherent equitable authority” to supple-
ment the record on appeal with material that was not before 
the district court.100 In deciding whether to exercise that au-
thority, the circuit considers three factors: (1) whether allowing 
the evidence would resolve the issue, (2) whether “remanding 
the case to the district court for consideration of the additional 
material would . . . be[] ‘contrary to both the interests of justice 
and the efficient use of judicial resources,’” and (3) whether the 
case is a habeas corpus proceeding.101 
The Eleventh Circuit is not alone in its occasional willing-
ness to supplement the record with new evidence. The Second 
Circuit also asserts expansive authority to supplement the rec-
ord (although it does so by implementing a broader reading of 
10(e) rather than by relying on an inherent authority).102 The 
Eighth Circuit allowed new evidence into the record before con-
sidering a motion for a preliminary injunction in a trademark 
infringement suit based on “interests of justice” concerns.103 
According to the Eighth Circuit, because the district court only 
considered one of the trademarks when denying the motion 
when, in fact, three trademarks were at issue, it was necessary 
to consider all of them after finding that “misrepresentation[s]” 
 
 98. See MARVELL, supra note 16, at 157–59. 
 99. See, e.g., Schwartz, 341 F.3d at 1225 n.4. 
 100. See Ross v. Kemp, 785 F.2d 1467, 1474 (11th Cir. 1986). 
 101. Id. at 1475 (quoting Dickerson v. Alabama, 667 F.2d 1364, 1367 (11th 
Cir. 1982)); see also Ouachita Watch League v. Jacobs, 463 F.3d, 1163, 1168, 
1170–71 (11th Cir. 2006) (permitting new evidence on appeal regarding the 
issue of standing). However, these factors are guidelines, meaning they are not 
always used in each case. Ross, 785 F.2d at 1475. 
 102. United States v. Aulet, 618 F.2d 182, 186 (2d Cir. 1980) (relying on a 
prior version of Rule 10(e)); see also Ross, 785 F.2d at 1476 n.16 (recognizing 
that the Second Circuit relied on Rule 10(e) to supplement the record). 
 103. Dakota Indus., Inc. v. Dakota Sportswear, Inc., 988 F.2d 61, 63 (8th 
Cir. 1993). 
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of facts by the appellee had left the district court with an “in-
complete picture of the [alleged] infringement.”104 
As support for its exercise of this inherent authority to 
supplement, the Eleventh Circuit relies on the Supreme Court’s 
flexibility regarding the rules governing preservation.105 In 
Singleton v. Wulff, the Supreme Court held:  
The matter of what questions may be taken up and resolved for the 
first time on appeal is one left primarily to the discretion of the courts 
of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual cases. We an-
nounce no general rule. Certainly there are circumstances in which a 
federal appellate court is justified in resolving an issue not passed on 
below, as where the proper resolution is beyond any doubt . . . or 
where “injustice might otherwise result.”106 
As noted above, the rule regarding record review is tightly con-
nected with the traditional rules of preservation.107 It is not 
surprising that the Eleventh Circuit saw in the Singleton lan-
guage some room suggesting that flexibility regarding new ar-
guments might also be applied to new facts supporting those 
arguments. It is not clear, however, whether the Supreme 
Court would be as generous in its application of the statement 
to supplementation of the factual record. Unlike consideration 
of arguments, to which the language in Singleton is targeted, 
consideration of new evidence would appear to be a special 
case, particularly given the general understanding about the 
trial court’s specialization in the world of fact-finding, as well 
as principles of comity (which generally call for the trial court 
to be the first judicial entity to consider the effect of particular 
facts on the case).108 That said, as discussed above, there really 
is very little positive law upon which the Supreme Court (or 
 
 104. Id.; see also More Light Invs. v. Morgan Stanley DW Inc., 415 Fed. 
App’x 1, 2 (9th Cir. 2011) (denying the motion to strike new evidence from ex-
cerpts of record since “this is the extraordinary case in which the documents 
are helpful to the court and are not prejudicial to either party”); Acumed LLC 
v. Advanced Surgical Servs., Inc., 561 F.3d 199 (3rd Cir. 2009) (“[ I ]n excep-
tional circumstances a court of appeals may allow a party to supplement the 
record on appeal.”). 
 105. See Ross, 785 F.2d at 1475 n.15. 
 106. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121 (1976) (quoting Hormel v. 
Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 557 (1941)). 
 107. See discussion supra Part I.B. 
 108. Comity is a “practice among political entities (as nations, states, or 
courts of different jurisdictions), involving esp. mutual recognition of legisla-
tive, executive, and judicial acts.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 303 (9th ed. 
2009). For a discussion of the principles of comity, see 21 C.J.S Courts § 307 
(2012). 
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courts of appeal) might rely in order to give guidance regarding 
the appropriate consideration of new evidence on appeal.109 
At least some state appellate courts similarly rely on in-
herent powers in allowing themselves to consider new evidence 
on appeal. The Minnesota Supreme Court, for instance, held 
that “[a]lthough an appellate court is ordinarily limited to a 
consideration of matters contained in the record before it, we 
think it has inherent power to look beyond the record where the 
orderly administration of justice commends it.”110 
What lesson can we take from the willingness of these 
courts to exercise largely unconstrained authority to consider 
non-record evidence? Although the Conclusion returns to this 
issue, the range of cases allowing new evidence on appeal 
should suggest that, at least in some situations, the record re-
view rule is not as monolithic as the traditional view suggests. 
These cases strongly suggest that there is room for flexibility at 
the appellate level, as long as considering new evidence on ap-
peal serves the broader goals of ensuring the rapid (but never-
theless fair) resolution of the appeal or addressing impermissi-
ble strategic behavior by parties in the courts below.  
3. Consideration of Jurisdictional Facts 
The next significant means by which new evidence on ap-
peal may be used is in an appellate court’s effort to resolve 
questions about jurisdiction. Almost without exception, appel-
late courts are willing to consider new evidence regarding ju-
risdictional matters, even if (and especially if) the jurisdictional 
concerns were not raised in the courts below.111 Although noth-
ing would prevent appellate courts from remanding a case to 
the trial court in order to resolve a particularly complex factual 
dispute relating to jurisdiction,112 it is quite common for courts 
to consider new evidence at the appellate level—whether pro-
vided by attorneys or independently researched by the court  
itself. 
 
 109. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 110. Crystal Beach Bay Ass’n v. Koochiching Cnty., 243 N.W.2d 40, 43 
(Minn. 1976) (citing Baker v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 193 S.W.2d 363, 366 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1946)). 
 111. See infra notes 115–20 and accompanying text. 
 112. See, e.g., Aloe Vera of Am., Inc. v. United States, 580 F.3d 867, 873 
(9th Cir. 2009) (remanding for factual determinations regarding subject mat-
ter jurisdiction); United States v. Ceja-Prado, 333 F.3d 1046, 1051–52 (9th Cir. 
2003) (same); E.R. Squibb & Sons v. Accident & Cas. Ins. Co., 160 F.3d 925, 
938–39 (2d Cir. 1998) (same). 
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For example, in Belleville Catering Co. v. Champaign Mar-
ket Place, L.L.C.,113 the Seventh Circuit (which is well-known 
for being particularly attentive to issues of subject-matter ju-
risdiction)114 stated that while “exploring” the question of di-
versity jurisdiction before oral argument, it discovered that one 
of the corporate entities in the case was likely non-diverse vis-
à-vis the defendants.115 Rather than remand for further find-
ings, the court ordered the parties to provide supplemental 
briefing on the subject of diversity jurisdiction and ultimately 
concluded that such jurisdiction was lacking.116 Although the 
decision in Belleville does not reference any authority permit-
ting the court to consider this new evidence on appeal, the cir-
cuit has, in other cases, referenced 28 U.S.C. § 1653 and inter-
preted it as allowing, for purposes of considering whether 
diversity jurisdiction exists, submission of affidavits supplying 
non-record information regarding citizenship.117 Similarly, the 
Fifth Circuit has noted, in the context of determining whether 
an appeal was filed in a timely manner, that “this court has the 
discretionary power to order supplementation of the record on 
appeal, and may do so ‘of its own initiative.’”118 
Most, though not all, state courts apply similar principles. 
By statute, Texas provides that “[e]ach court of appeals may, on 
affidavit or otherwise, as the court may determine, ascertain 
 
 113. 350 F.3d 691 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 114. See, e.g., 7TH CIR. R. 28(a) (providing extensive direction to parties re-
garding the content of the jurisdictional statement required by parties under 
Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(4)). In particular, Judge Frank H. Easterbrook of the 
Seventh Circuit (who is the author of the opinion in Belleville) is “regarded as 
a stickler for adhering closely to jurisdictional limitations on the power of 
courts.” M. Todd Henderson, Justifying Jones, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1027, 1027 
(2010). 
 115. Belleville, 350 F.3d at 692. 
 116. The court’s dissatisfaction with the work of counsel on the jurisdic-
tional question was represented by its conclusion that 
[t]he best way for counsel to make the litigants whole is to perform, 
without additional fees, any further services that are necessary to 
bring this suit to a conclusion in state court, or via settlement. That 
way the clients will pay just once for the litigation. This is intended 
not as a sanction, but simply to ensure that clients need not pay for 
lawyers’ time that has been wasted for reasons beyond the clients’ 
control. 
Id. at 694. 
 117. See 28 U.S.C. § 1653 (2006); Stockman v. LaCroix, 790 F.2d 584, 587 
(7th Cir. 1986). 
 118. In re GHR Energy Corp., 791 F.2d 1200, 1202 (5th Cir. 1986) (citing 
Dickerson v. Alabama, 667 F.2d 1364, 1367 (5th Cir. 1982)). 
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the matters of fact that are necessary to the proper exercise of 
its jurisdiction.”119 On the other hand, the Idaho Supreme 
Court insists that when sitting “in an appellate capacity . . . we 
are bound to consider only the record and cannot find facts dur-
ing our inquiry into whether we have jurisdiction to review [the 
administrative decision below].”120 Given its adherence to the 
record review rule, in the face of a significant jurisdictional 
question, the court will remand the case for further considera-
tion.121 Idaho is somewhat unusual; as long as the facts at issue 
are not complex, most courts view their jurisdictional limits as 
sufficient justification for considering new evidence on appeal.122 
As a general matter, courts are quite willing to consider 
new evidence on appeal when evaluating questions of jurisdic-
tion.123 In such cases, this willingness to deviate from the rec-
ord review rule is rooted in an apparent belief that, in circum-
stances presenting relatively straightforward jurisdictional 
questions, any benefits associated with a strict adherence to 
the rule would be outweighed by the cost of remanding the case 
for further proceedings.124 Once again, as with the exercise of 
inherent power noted in the prior Section, the record review 
rule in these cases is brushed aside by other, apparently more 
practical, considerations. 
4. A Definitional Interlude: Legislative Facts, Judicial Notice, 
and the Record Review Principle 
The facts considered on appeal in the prior examples are 
generally (although not exclusively) adjudicative. The next four 
 
 119. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.220(c) (West 2011); see Bloom v. Bloom, 
935 S.W.2d 942, 943–45 (Tex. App. 1996) (considering affidavit provided on 
appeal alleging that wife had accepted substantial benefits under divorce de-
cree, and seeking application of “acceptance of benefits” doctrine to bar appel-
late court jurisdiction). 
 120. In re City of Shelley, 255 P.3d 1175, 1180 (Idaho 2011). 
 121. Cf. id. (emphasizing the degree to which an appellate court is preclud-
ed from finding its own facts). 
 122. See supra notes 113–21 and accompanying text. 
 123. See supra notes 113–21 and accompanying text. 
 124. The court may be particularly concerned with the costs associated 
with establishing jurisdiction, as demonstrated by Judge Easterbrook’s lament 
in Stockman that 
[w]e have now done what the parties and the district court should 
have done—established that there is complete diversity. The exercise 
has consumed the time of two teams of lawyers and three judges. It 
could have been done more quickly had it been done right in the first 
place. 
Stockman v. LaCroix, 790 F.2d 584, 587 (7th Cir. 1986).  
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examples involve situations in which the courts, especially the 
U.S. Supreme Court and state courts of last resort, find them-
selves considering what is typically (though not always) new 
legislative evidence on appeal.125 Before discussing those excep-
tions, however, the distinction between adjudicative and legis-
lative facts, and the role that judicial notice rules play in judi-
cial consideration of these facts, should be reviewed in more 
detail. 
a. Adjudicative vs. Legislative Facts 
The initial distinction between legislative and adjudicative 
fact was first made in Kenneth Culp Davis’s seminal article on 
the use of evidence by administrative agencies.126 In that arti-
cle, Davis pointed out that  
[w]hen an agency finds facts concerning immediate parties—what the 
parties did, what the circumstances were, what the background con-
ditions were—the agency is performing an adjudicative function, and 
the facts may conveniently be called adjudicative facts. When an 
agency wrestles with a question of law or policy, it is acting legisla-
tively, just as judges have created the common law through judicial 
legislation, and the facts which inform its legislative judgment may 
conveniently be denominated legislative facts.127 
The term adjudicative fact has largely settled into common 
usage,128 and refers simply to “the facts of the particular 
case.”129 It is possible to divide adjudicative facts into two fur-
ther categories: historical facts (which address “who did what, 
when and where, and whether with or without a defined state 
of mind”)130 and “interpretive” or “evaluative” facts (which are 
addressed to question “whether what was done violated a legal 
standard for evaluating conduct.”)131 
Legislative facts encompass information that is factual, in 
the sense that it is amenable to proof of some kind, but that is 
not directly related to the facts of a given case.132 Legislative 
 
 125. See Gorod, supra note 2, at 34–35, 46–48 (discussing examples in 
which the U.S. Supreme Court and intermediate federal appellate courts re-
lied on the use of legislative facts). 
 126. Davis, supra note 19, at 402–10; see also See, supra note 9, at 195 
(“Legislative facts are those relevant to the court’s thinking about what the 
law ought to be instead of what the facts of the case are.”). 
 127. Davis, supra note 19, at 402–03. 
 128. Mass. Med. Soc’y v. Dukakis, 637 F. Supp. 684, 689 (D. Mass. 1986). 
 129. FED. R. EVID. 201 advisory committee’s notes. 
 130. Mass. Med. Soc’y, 637 F. Supp. at 691. 
 131. Id. 
 132. See id.  
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facts encompass information that is “descriptive, and some-
times predictive, information about the larger world.”133 
Commentators use terms other than “legislative fact” to 
describe this class of information. One of the few judicial opin-
ions that struggled intensively with the distinctions between 
legislative and adjudicative facts instead chose the term “non-
adjudicative facts” to refer to the full scope of factual material 
that did not directly bear on the parties in the case and their 
behavior.134 In his study of appellate courts and counsel, Mar-
vell used the term “social facts,” both because he was concerned 
that Davis’s definition had been used in an insufficiently rigor-
ous manner, and because he believed that the surveys he was 
conducting would be clearer with the term “social facts.”135 In 
Marvell’s lexicon, historical adjudicative facts became “case 
facts,” while interpretive adjudicative facts were “supporting 
case facts.”136 Although at least some commentators use Mar-
vell’s term,137 this Article uses the term legislative facts be-
cause the bulk of the legal commentary on this issue does so as 
well.138 
b. Judicial Notice and Legislative Facts 
The distinction between legislative and adjudicative fact is 
important because, as Davis noted, the rules of evidence (when 
Davis wrote in 1942, they were merely proposed rules)139 were 
primarily designed to address the use of adjudicative fact and 
do not easily carry over to consideration of legislative facts.140 
In particular, Federal Rule of Evidence 201, governing judicial 
notice, applies only to judicial notice of adjudicative facts.141 
 
 133. Gorod, supra note 2, at 39. 
 134. Mass. Med. Soc’y, 637 F. Supp. at 689. 
 135. MARVELL, supra note 16, at 139 & 339–40 n.2. 
 136. Id. at 139. Marvell further distinguished between “facts about the dis-
pute only” that were used for the purpose of lawmaking (“case facts used as 
social facts”), and facts about more than the dispute (“social facts”). Id. 
 137. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Charles W. Mulaney, Judging Facts 
Like Law, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 69, 72 (2008). 
 138. On the general difficulty of defining legislative fact, see 21B CHARLES 
ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 
§ 5103.2 (2d ed. 2005). 
 139. See Davis, supra note 19, at 405. 
 140. See id.  
 141. FED. R. EVID. 201(a) (“This rule governs only judicial notice of adjudi-
cative facts.”). 
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The rule is intentionally silent regarding judicial notice of legis-
lative facts that bear on questions of law or policy.142 
The decision to leave a wide range of facts outside of the 
scope of the judicial review rule recognizes that there are some 
facts that courts (or, for that matter, juries) must have in order 
to be able to do their job, but that cannot, as a practical matter, 
be deemed either beyond reasonable dispute or introduced 
through the adversarial process.143 Courts engaged in the pro-
cess of interpreting the law need to be able to consider “the fac-
tual ingredients of problems of what the law ought to be”144 
without being required to seek that information solely through 
the offerings of parties at trial, or in the hands of otherwise un-
questionably accurate sources.145 In addition, “every case in-
volves the use of hundreds or thousands of non-evidence 
facts”146 that could not reasonably be introduced into evidence, 
even if the parties were to try.147 
In sum, legislative facts in the federal system are generally 
not subject to the judicial notice rule. Although one might think 
that this means that judicial notice of such information is im-
permissible, as it is simply outside the scope of the rules alto-
gether, the assumption has been that legislative facts can be 
considered by trial courts without going through formal eviden-
tiary processes, and without that information being indisputa-
ble as a practical matter.148 The lack of guidance, in other 
words, is interpreted to be a free-for-all.149 Thus, parties may 
offer legislative facts as evidence,150 and trial courts are enti-
 
 142. FED. R. EVID. 201 advisory committee’s notes. 
 143. See id.  
 144. See id. (quoting Kenneth Culp Davis, A System of Judicial Notice 
Based on Fairness and Convenience, in PERSPECTIVES OF LAW 69, 83 (Roscoe 
Pound et al. eds., 1964)). 
 145. See id.  
 146. Id. (citing Davis, supra note 144, at 73). 
 147. See id.  
 148. Cf. FED. R. EVID. 201(a) (outlining the scope of judicial notice). 
 149. Dissatisfied with this lack of guidance, some states modified their ju-
dicial notice statutes to cover both adjudicative and legislative fact. See 
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 138, at § 5103.2 n.9 (noting examples of Indi-
ana, Alaska, and Montana). As discussed below, however, the extension of the 
rule to legislative fact is unlikely to have had a significant effect on judicial 
decision making. See infra notes 163–64 and accompanying text. 
 150. There are many significant recent examples in which the trial courts 
took extensive evidence regarding the legislative facts underlying the adoption 
of the legal principles at issue. In Perry v. Schwarzenegger, for instance, the 
parties offered, and the trial court made extensive factual findings regarding, 
a wide range of testimony amounting to legislative facts regarding the mar-
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tled to consider that information, or even to do their own re-
search in order to resolve their own legislative fact questions.151 
Appellate courts must be able to consider legislative facts 
as well; after all, “legislative facts are particularly conducive to 
the appellate courts’ task of considering normative values when 
creating new law.”152 As with trial courts, however, there is 
very little guidance regarding (a) the use of such information on 
appeal, (b) how, where, and when to find it,153 and (c) the role 
that the record review principle plays in appellate considera-
tion of such facts. A default approach to managing questions of 
legislative fact might involve simply remanding a case to the 
trial court for the development of legislative facts in appropri-
ate cases.154 As the remainder of Part II notes, however, this 
choice is a rare one;155 far more common is a willingness by ap-
pellate courts to consider new evidence on legislative facts at 
every turn, generally with very little attention to the role that 
the new information has in the case, the quality of that infor-
mation, or the effect that its consideration has on the appellate 
process generally.156 
 
riage of homosexual men and women, and the ban on such marriage imposed 
by California’s Proposition 8. See 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 956–91 (N.D. Cal. 
2010); see also Mass. Med. Soc’y v. Dukakis, 637 F. Supp. 684, 692 (D. Mass. 
1986) (concluding that parties could present legislative facts, and the court 
could consider those facts or legislative facts generated through its own  
research). 
 151. See Mass. Med. Soc’y, 637 F. Supp. at 692; infra Part II.B.8. 
 152. See A.J. Stephani, Theraputic Jurisprudence in the Appellate Arena: 
Judicial Notice and the Potential of the Legislative Fact Remand, 24 SEATTLE 
U. L. REV. 509, 510 (2000). 
 153. STERN, supra note 17, § 10.12, at 278 (2d ed. 1989) (“Judges and com-
mentators have been aware that this does not provide courts with much guid-
ance as to how and where to find reliable legislative factual information.”). 
 154. See Davis, supra note 19, at 403 & n.79 (citing Borden’s Farm Prod-
ucts, Inc. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 194 (1934) (remanding for development of legis-
lative facts)). Some commentators have argued for a much more vigorous ap-
plication of this approach. Stephani, supra note 152. 
 155. See Davis, supra note 9, at 9 (noting that legislative fact remand “has 
failed to take hold, perhaps because the procedure is especially awkward”). 
 156. An interesting question, beyond the scope of this Article, is what 
standard of review appellate courts should use in reviewing trial court (or, for 
that matter, congressional) findings regarding legislative facts. Because the 
scenario under consideration in this article presumes that there were no rele-
vant findings in the trial court (because there was no evidence), we need not 
address the problem here. Cf. McGinnis & Mulaney, supra note 137, at 76–81 
(discussing the standard of review used by the Supreme Court in examining 
congressional findings). 
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c. Judicial Notice and New Evidence on Appeal 
In light of the above discussion, it should not be surprising 
that the judicial notice rule does little to justify the use of new 
evidence on appeal that is discussed in the first three examples 
regarding simple agreement, supplementing the record, and 
consideration of jurisdictional facts. First, in most of these ex-
amples, the facts at issue would not fit within the scope of the 
judicial notice rule because they remain specific to the parties 
and are not “generally known” or capable of being “accurately 
and readily determined” by reference to indisputably accurate 
sources.157 
Second, the judicial notice rule says nothing about whether 
judicially noticed evidence can be considered by appellate 
courts for the first time on appeal.158 While appellate courts 
certainly do take judicial notice of some information, it is not at 
all uncommon for them to nevertheless refuse to consider that 
information if it was not presented to the trial court in the first 
instance.159 With a few limited exceptions, judicial notice prin-
ciples do not provide a clear basis for appellate courts to rely 
upon in considering new evidence on appeal. As one practition-
er noted, judicial notice 
is not an opportunity to second-guess the trial court. The appellate 
court may take judicial notice of appropriate items as permitted un-
der Federal Rule of Evidence 201, but will not do so if the item was 
previously available but counsel, for tactical reasons, chose not to put 
it before the trial court.160 
The point is illustrated by the California Court of Appeals’ 
decision in Hahn v. Diaz-Barba.161 Adhering to the preserva-
tion rule, the California Court of Appeals refused to take judi-
cial notice of provisions of Mexican law (though such infor-
mation would generally be subject to judicial notice), 
concluding that “[r]eviewing courts generally do not take judi-
cial notice of evidence not presented to the trial court. Rather, 
normally when reviewing the correctness of a trial court’s 
judgment, an appellate court will consider only matters which 
 
 157. See FED. R. EVID. 201(b). 
 158. See id. 201. 
 159. As discussed infra, even if parties stipulate to particular facts, they 
are not free of the rule requiring that those facts be presented to the district 
court in the first instance. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
 160. Richman, supra note 86, at 175 (comparing In re American Biomateri-
als Corp., 954 F.2d 919, 922 (3d Cir. 1992), with Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Leb.) 
S.A.L., 838 F.2d 904, 907 (7th Cir. 1988)). 
 161. Hahn v. Diaz-Barba, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 242 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011). 
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were part of the record at the time the judgment was en-
tered.”162 
Judicial notice on appeal of new legislative facts faces simi-
lar problems. Even if the judicial notice rule were to be applied 
to legislative facts (and it is, in some cases),163 it would general-
ly bar consideration of these facts, since very few of them are 
indisputable.164 Furthermore, the record review problem re-
mains: even if judicial notice of new information were appro-
priate, record review and preservation principles would (as in 
Hahn) often interfere with the appellate court’s ability and 
willingness to consider that new evidence on appeal. 
d. Appellate Reliance on New Evidence of Legislative Facts  
There is, therefore, no specific ground upon which appel-
late courts can rely in considering new evidence regarding leg-
islative facts. Nevertheless, it is indisputable that appellate 
courts do consider it.165 “One may safely venture the guess that 
over the centuries the judges who have produced our vast body 
of common law have not limited their deliberations to facts of 
record and facts which are ‘obvious and notorious’ or ‘of indis-
putable accuracy,’ within the narrow boundaries of judicial no-
tice.”166 The U.S. Supreme Court’s “implicit or explicit determi-
nation of social facts has been essential to many well known 
holdings.”167 
There are many examples of situations in which new evi-
dence is considered by appellate courts in determining legisla-
tive facts. In his original article defining the nature of legisla-
tive facts, Davis discussed several examples from the U.S. 
Supreme Court, as well as from state supreme courts.168 Thirty 
years later, in his lecture published in Minnesota Law Review, 
 
 162. Id. at 256. 
 163. See FED. R. EVID. 201(a). 
 164. See id. 201 advisory committee’s note (“[Legislative f ]acts most needed 
in thinking about difficult problems of law and policy have a way of being out-
side the domain of the clearly indisputable.”) (citing Davis, supra note 144, at 
82); Davis, supra note 19, at 403 (noting the disputability of most legislative 
facts). 
 165. Mass. Med. Soc’y v. Dukakis 637 F. Supp. 684, 692 (D. Mass 1986) 
(noting that “an appellate court, in its decisionmaking, is not confined to the 
record of evidence presented to the trial court,” but rather, may consider “ad-
ditional sources” of evidence, including “independent library research”). 
 166. Davis, supra note 19. 
 167. McGinnis & Mulaney, supra note 137, at 72. 
 168. Davis, supra note 19, at 403–06. 
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Davis identified yet more.169 The “use of ‘legislative fact’ in con-
stitutional litigation is so common that one could cite any of a 
number of Supreme Court decisions.”170 In Ballew v. Georgia, 
for instance, the Court considered whether a five-person state 
criminal jury provided the necessary constitutional protec-
tion.171 In conducting that review, Justice Blackmun’s plurality 
opinion examined “a quantity of scholarly work” regarding the 
effect of jury size on the quality of the decision; notably, much 
of that work had been generated in response to earlier Court 
decisions on jury size.172 Almost without exception, the Court’s 
consideration of the results of these new studies amounted to 
reliance on new evidence on appeal.173  
The Court is not unaware of the difficulties posed by the 
use of legislative facts. Justice Harry Blackmun, whose opin-
ions regularly relied to a great degree on legislative facts as 
found by his own studies, once noted that the Court “face[s] in-
stitutional limitations on [its] ability to gather information 
about ‘legislative facts.’”174 Chief Justice Warren Burger con-
ceded that the truth of facts as to legislative or policy matters 
“cannot be tested by conventional judicial processes.”175 
This tension between the regular use of legislative facts 
and the procedural limitations associated with considering 
them is echoed in the academic literature. Professor Davis, for 
instance, argued that “[m]uch of our law is based on wrong as-
sumptions about legislative facts,” and complained that “[n]o 
one has planned the present system under which the procedure 
of appellate courts, designed for adjudication of questions of 
law, is used for a large portion of all the lawmaking that is 
 
 169. Davis, supra note 9, at 9–10. 
 170. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 138. 
 171. 435 U.S. 223, 224 (1978) (plurality opinion). 
 172. Id. at 232–39. Justice Powell concurred in the judgment alone, believ-
ing that the studies did not prove the majority’s point—thus proving the point 
that most legislative facts are themselves subject to dispute. See id. at 246 
(Powell, J., concurring). 
 173. See, e.g., id. at 224 (plurality opinion) (noting that the primary issue 
at trial was certainly guilt or innocence—petitioner was accused of distrib-
uting obscene materials—rather than an academic discussion regarding the 
effect of jury size on its deliberations). 
 174. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 927 (1984) (Blackmun, J.,  
concurring). 
 175. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 405 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) 
(arguing that legislative action is preferable when the dispute is rooted in fac-
tual claims that “cannot be tested” by judicial process). 
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done in the whole society. No one would plan such a system.”176 
By contrast, John McGinnis and Charles Mulaney were more 
enthusiastic about the role of courts in evaluating legislative 
facts; they even suggested that the courts are just as well-
positioned as legislatures in evaluating the validity of legisla-
tive facts because courts, unlike legislatures, have experience 
as an unbiased adjudicator engaged in an effort to dispassion-
ately evaluate the various factual claims that are made in most 
disputes regarding legislative fact.177 
With this grounding in the underlying principles and prob-
lems associated with the judicial consideration of legislative 
fact, we are in a better position to consider the final four mech-
anisms by which appellate courts are introduced to new evi-
dence on appeal. 
5. “Brandeis Briefs” and Legislative Facts on the Merits 
In seeking a court’s approval for a new proposition of law, 
or in defending (or attacking) a legislative action as unconstitu-
tional, parties will often need to rely upon references to social, 
political, economic, and technical facts.178 Unless the proposi-
tion of law in question was a significant issue at trial, parties 
often find that the first real opportunity to present this evi-
dence to the courts is in their appellate brief on the merits. 
Prior to becoming a Supreme Court justice, Louis Brandeis 
was a respected, progressive attorney who was particularly 
well-known for writing just this kind of policy-oriented brief.179 
The prototypical “Brandeis brief” was the merits brief he draft-
ed for the State in Muller v. Oregon.180 In order to defend the 
validity of Oregon’s law limiting the work hours of women, 
Brandeis included in his brief on the merits an exhaustive dis-
cussion of the economic and social science literature, all intend-
ed to demonstrate that the State’s legislation was an “appro-
priate and legitimate” effort to protect the health and safety of 
female workers. The brief included well over 100 pages of dis-
cussion about industrial studies.181 In ruling for Brandeis’s cli-
ent, the Supreme Court reasoned that taking judicial notice of 
 
 176. Davis, supra note 9, at 15, 7. 
 177. See McGinnis & Mulaney, supra note 137, at 73. 
 178. See Margolis, supra note 9, at 210–13. 
 179. See MELVIN I. UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: A LIFE 201–27 (2009). 
 180. 208 U.S. 412 (1908); see also UROFSKY, supra note 179, at 212–19 (de-
scribing development of the brief ). 
 181. UROFSKY, supra note 179, at 212–19. 
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“expressions of opinions from other than judicial sources” could 
be an aid to their understanding of the case.182 This was true 
even though the information cited by Brandeis was subject to 
dispute, and even though none of the information had been in-
troduced at the trial level.183 
Brandeis’s success in Muller guaranteed that his extra-
record, social science-laden brief—the first Brandeis brief—
would be modeled in a number of subsequent cases.184 Almost 
by definition, those briefs rely heavily on the use of social sci-
ence information that was probably not introduced in the trial 
court, and which would, if it had been presented in the trial 
court, likely have been disputed.185 Nevertheless, the Brandeis 
brief is a widely accepted model for merits briefing in cases that 
present significant policy questions. Even Kenneth Davis, who 
was quite critical of the unconstrained use of new evidence on 
appeal by courts, argued that “Brandeis briefs should be en-
couraged; the Court now welcomes them, but not many are 
filed.”186 
Despite the long history of new evidence in Brandeis briefs, 
appellate litigator Robert Stern has noted that the use of new 
evidence in appellate briefs is no guarantee that it will be con-
sidered, given the record review rule: 
Just when in a particular litigation legislative facts can be so estab-
lished, or whether the safer course would be to include them in a trial 
record, is a matter for the judgment of the litigating lawyer in the 
first instance. I suspect that the Brandeis brief technique is often em-
ployed by lawyers newly brought in on appeal, after it is too late to in-
troduce the facts into the trial court record.187 
 
 182. Muller, 208 U.S. at 419. 
 183. UROFSKY, supra note 179, at 214–16 (noting the research work that 
was conducted in order provide Brandeis with the necessary facts, as well as 
the general record review rule); id. at 221–22 (noting significant technical and 
scientific problems that have been identified in the original Brandeis brief ); 
see also STERN, supra note 17, § 10.12, at 279 (“[F]acts not of record which one 
party might call to a court’s attention might not necessarily be indisputable on 
their face or by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot be reasonably  
questioned.”). 
 184. UROFSKY, supra note 179, at 219 (noting use of such a brief in Brown 
v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494–95 & n.11 (1954)). 
 185. Id.; see also STERN, supra note 17, § 10.12, at 279. 
 186. Davis, supra note 9, at 15; see also Margolis, supra note 9, at 219 (ar-
guing for the use of legislative fact in merits briefing). 
 187. STERN, supra note 17, § 10.12, at 279. 
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Stern identifies an important problem of timing. Present-
ing legislative facts at trial is both possible and preferred,188 
and parties who can anticipate the need for legislative facts in 
their litigation may well be able to offer evidence regarding 
them at trial.189 Nevertheless, the focus of an appellate case is 
often quite different than the focus at trial, and if the need for 
legislative facts is not apparent at the trial level, no choice re-
mains but to offer new evidence on appeal. 
The primary concern associated with the use of the evi-
dence presented in these briefs is the lack of vetting through 
the normal evidentiary process in the trial court and subse-
quent reliance, by both counsel and court, on erroneous conclu-
sions or bad research.190 The public nature of merits briefing, 
along with the back-and-forth of filing answering and reply 
briefs, can help alleviate these concerns. For that reason, courts 
relying on merits briefs may be on more solid factual ground 
than if they were researching legislative facts on their own.191 
In the end, however, there can be no guarantee that appellate 
consideration of new evidence will reach accurate conclusions. 
The best cure for error is for the court to set forth, in its opin-
ion, those facts upon which it is relying, as well as the source(s) 
of those facts. If subsequent analysis reveals factual errors, 
such a transparent opinion should ensure that the effect of 
those errors on the decision will be apparent. 
6. Amicus Briefs as a Source of New Evidence on Appeal 
Although briefs filed by parties can be a source of new in-
formation, it is briefs filed by nonparties that have proved to be 
a particularly significant source of new evidence on appeal. The 
amicus brief has become an important part of appellate prac-
 
 188. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 9, at 11. Davis notes that 
[w]hen legislative facts are needed for a sound decision, a trial court 
can do better than an appellate court, because it is free to take evi-
dence on questions of legislative facts. Some trial courts do so, with 
creditable results. Even so, I have to point out that the normal evi-
dence-taking process may be a total misfit for legislative facts. 
Id. (citing as an example Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 
243 n.50 (5th Cir. 1976) (excluding relevant and important legislative facts as 
hearsay)). 
 189. See, e.g., Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 932–938 (N.D. 
Cal. 2010) (detailing the evidence introduced in the trial court concerning the 
legislative intent regarding California’s gay marriage initiative). 
 190. See Margolis, supra note 9, at 232. 
 191. See infra Part II.B.8 (discussing independent research by judges as a 
source of new evidence). 
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tice, particularly before the U.S. Supreme Court,192 and as one 
recent article noted, “in many instances the Court has not con-
fined its review to evidence introduced in the district court, in-
stead relying on evidence submitted by amicus briefs at the 
Supreme Court level.”193  
More than any other type of brief filed at an appellate 
court, those drafted by amici contain a significant portion of 
new evidence. Amici are newcomers to the case, and because 
they were typically not involved at the trial court level, they 
may feel particularly unconstrained by the record review 
rule.194 In addition, because amici often have specialized 
knowledge and interests on the matters presented in a case, 
they are often a particularly rich source for new evidence on 
appeal.195 
The resulting reliance on amicus briefs is entirely con-
sistent with their historic purpose. “The role of the original 
[Roman] amicus was to provide a court with legal information 
that was beyond its notice or expertise.”196 This historical re-
sponsibility is still a very important function: 
Informing the Court is not limited to a restatement of record facts, 
but includes relating other circumstances that should be considered 
in resolving the controversy. Amici can supply nonrecord facts of 
which the court may take judicial notice. . . . This function, that of 
 
 192. See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus 
Curiae Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PENN. L. REV. 743, 744 (2000) 
(noting that, in “recent years,” amicus briefs were filed in nearly eighty-five 
percent of the U.S. Supreme Court’s argued cases); id. at 751–57. 
 193. McGinnis & Mulaney, supra note 137, at 82. 
 194. See REAGAN WILLIAM SIMPSON & MARY VASALY, THE AMICUS BRIEF: 
HOW TO WRITE IT AND USE IT EFFECTIVELY 31 (ABA ed., 3d ed. 2010) (“The 
facts an amicus intends to present may not be contained in the record of the 
case, and may extend beyond the facts of the particular case at issue.”). As 
representatives of constituencies who will be affected not by the judgment, but 
by the precedential value of the court’s decision in the case, amici are particu-
larly interested in communicating with the court on broad policy issues (which 
require the use of legislative facts). See SCOTT A. COMPARATO, AMICI CURIAE 
AND STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR IN STATE SUPREME COURTS 62–65, 105–110 (2003) 
(noting that amici briefs may provide more and/or different information than 
is contained in litigant briefs). 
 195. See, e.g., PAUL M. COLLINS, JR., FRIENDS OF THE SUPREME COURT 70–
71 (2008) (describing a number of cases in which amici presented the Court 
with additional evidence that would not have been presented in the trial 
court); SIMPSON & VASALY, supra note 194, at 35 (noting role of “expert”  
amici). 
 196. REAGAN WILLIAM SIMPSON & MARY R. VASALY, THE AMICUS BRIEF: 
HOW TO BE A GOOD FRIEND OF THE COURT 1 (ABA ed., 2d ed. 2004) . 
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supplementing the record to help persuade the Court, is still one of 
the amicus’s most important role[s].197 
It should come as no surprise, then, that the Supreme 
Court may rely heavily on amicus briefs as support for “factual 
contentions that were not introduced in the adversarial pro-
ceedings in the lower court.”198 McGinnis and Mulaney point 
out, for instance, that in Grutter v. Bollinger (addressing the 
validity of the University of Michigan’s diversity admissions 
program),199 the Court “relied on factual assertions in the ami-
cus briefs . . . in finding that diversity in education is a compel-
ling state interest, although these claims had never been sub-
ject to cross examination or other procedural scrutiny.”200 
Thus, while the information in amicus briefs often includes 
the same kind of legislative facts that one finds in Brandeis 
briefs,201 the outsider status of amici may lead them to present 
 
 197. John Howard, Retaliation, Reinstatement, and Friends of the Court: 
Amicus Participation in Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc., 31 HOW. L.J. 241, 
253–54, 255–56 (1988). 
 198. McGinnis & Mulaney, supra note 137, at 82. Amicus briefs are also 
valuable to the Court at the petition stage because they provide additional in-
formation about which interest groups believe a particular case is important, 
and why. See COLLINS, supra note 195, at 29 (noting that, according to one 
study, the presence of amici in support of a petition for certiorari was one of 
the three most important factors governing whether the Court would grant the 
petition); Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, Mapping out the Strategic Terrain: The 
Informational Role of Amici Curiae, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: 
NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 215, 221–22 (Cornell W. Clayton & 
Howard Gillman eds., 1999) (amicus briefs provide the court with information 
allowing the justices to make “precise calculations” regarding the nature of the 
political environment). The effect of such information is debatable; some com-
mentators believe that amicus briefs are most significant because of the in-
formation they convey regarding interest group attention to a case, not be-
cause of “new evidence” or legal arguments. See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 
192, at 782–86 (describing the “interest group” model of amicus influence on 
the Supreme Court). Notably, Kearney and Merrill’s study of amicus brief in-
fluence at the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the “legal model” of such 
influence—the one that presumes the importance of “new . . . background fac-
tual material” and “‘Brandeis Brief ’-type information,” is the model that is 
best supported by data regarding the impact of such briefs at the Court. Id. at 
748, 778, 816. 
 199. 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2000). 
 200. McGinnis & Mulaney, supra note 137, at 82 (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. 
at 330–32). McGinnis and Mulaney also point out a similar reliance on amicus 
briefs in United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996), specifically in the 
Court’s conclusion that the state’s justification for excluding women from the 
Virginia Military Institute was not sufficient. McGinnis & Mulaney, supra 
note 137, at 82 (citing United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 585–86 (1996) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
 201. EUGENE GRESSMAN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 741 (9th ed. 
2007). 
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a particularly wide range of new evidence on appeal, and the 
independence of the amici may well persuade a court to rely on 
that new evidence to a particularly substantial degree.202  
7. New Evidence and Petitions for Discretionary Review 
The next mechanism for introducing new evidence on ap-
peal is found almost exclusively in courts of last resort. In par-
ticular, those courts often ask parties seeking discretionary re-
view to demonstrate that the issues presented in their petition 
are important in a broader legal or social context.203 This ex-
ample is particularly unique, in that it is one of the few areas 
in which appellate courts almost explicitly require parties to 
present the courts with information that is outside the scope of 
the trial record.204 
Consider, for instance, Rule 10 of the U.S. Supreme Court, 
which calls for a party filing a petition for certiorari to demon-
strate in the petition that the petition presents questions re-
garding an “important matter” (Rule 10(a)), an “important fed-
eral question” (Rule 10(a) and (b)), or an “important question of 
federal law” (Rule 10(c)).205 
Parties seeking discretionary review in the state courts are 
generally called upon to make the same showing. In California, 
for instance, the Supreme Court may grant review in order to 
 
 202. See SIMPSON & VASALY, supra note 196, at 10 (noting that from 1985–
1995, “more than 35 percent of Supreme Court opinions in which amicus briefs 
were filed contained reference to at least one amicus brief.”); id. at 10–16 (col-
lecting case references to amicus briefs).  
 203. See, e.g., MINN. R. APP. P. 117(2)(a), (d)(2) (including “importance” and 
“possible statewide impact” among criteria considered in evaluation of a peti-
tion for discretionary review); N.Y. CT. APP. R. PRAC. 500.22(b)(4) (requiring 
motions for permission to appeal to include statement regarding why issue is 
of “public importance”); OR. R. APP. P. 9.07(3) (noting that number of people 
affected, and consequence of the decision to the public, is a criterion consid-
ered in evaluating a petition for review); cf. Diamond Ventures, LLC v. 
Barreto, 452 F.3d 892, 896 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (finding, on petition to allow dis-
cretionary interlocutory appeal, the “importance” requirement satisfied where 
“the privacy and competitive interests of the SBIC applicants . . . overcome the 
interest in finality”).  
 204. See See, supra note 9, at 176. 
 205. SUP. CT. R. 10; see also GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 201, at 262–63 
(noting “major significance” of “importance” to whether petition is granted, 
and how the “nature and number of persons affected” influences that determi-
nation); H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE 
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 253 (1991) (noting that “certworthiness” of 
petition to U.S. Supreme Court depended, in part, on whether petition pre-
sented issues “important to the polity . . . of huge political and social im-
portance . . . emanat[ing] from their impact on society”). 
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“settle an important question of law.”206 Oregon’s Supreme 
Court is even more explicit in its invitation to parties to offer 
evidence beyond the scope of what parties might have offered in 
the trial court: not only are parties required to demonstrate 
why their petition presents a question that has “importance be-
yond the particular case,”207 but parties are explicitly told that 
importance may turn, for instance, on “[w]hether the issue or a 
similar issue arises often,” “[w]hether many people are affected 
by the decision in the case,” and “[w]hether the consequence of 
the decision is important to the public, even if the issue may 
not arise often.”208 
In order to adequately meet this sort of request, parties 
must generally look well beyond the scope of the trial court rec-
ord. Demonstrating importance requires parties to place the 
questions for review into a broader legal, political, social, or 
economic context.209 While some of the facts showing that con-
text may well be part of the trial record, it would be rare for the 
record to have focused on importance to any substantial degree. 
This is true for at least three reasons. First, trial attorneys 
have little reason to think that importance (as a factual matter) 
will ever have a bearing on their case, not least because they 
would hope to win at trial and avoid a need to appeal at all. Se-
cond, even if the parties presciently believed that their case 
might one day require a petition for discretionary review, most 
trial judges would (properly!) reject as irrelevant a party’s ef-
 
 206. CAL. APP. R. 8.500(b)(1); see also id. at R. 8.504(b)(2) (requiring peti-
tion for review to state reasons for review under 8.500(b)). 
 207. OR. R. APP. P. 9.05(4)(c). 
 208. Id. 9.07(2)–(3). 
 209. Cf. Diamond Ventures, LLC v. Barreto, 452 F.3d 892, 896–98 (D.C. 
Cir. 2006) (referring to the privacy and competitive interests of applicants as 
the basis for a finding of sufficient importance to merit interlocutory review). 
Amicus briefs (and their accompanying introduction of new evidence on ap-
peal) can serve an important role in signaling the importance of a case to a 
court. Several commentators encourage parties seeking certiorari in the U.S. 
Supreme Court to solicit amicus support at the certiorari stage in order to im-
prove the chance of a petition being granted. See GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 
201, at 263; PERRY, supra note 205, at 135. 
  Admittedly, an important question of law might be important in an 
academic or legal sense (it might affect the way a large number of cases are 
processed, for instance) without necessarily being important as a political, 
economic, or social matter. A party might, therefore, be able to demonstrate 
importance without a clear need to resort to new information at the petition 
stage. In many other cases, however, a party will necessarily have to refer to 
new evidence on appeal if they hope to demonstrate the importance of their 
petition. 
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fort to offer evidence in order to demonstrate the future im-
portance of certain issues—particularly issues that the trial 
judge (presumably) thought were decided correctly in the first 
instance. Finally, because issues meriting discretionary review 
are often not sufficiently defined until after a decision by the 
intermediate appellate court, even prescient parties and willing 
trial judges would generally often guess incorrectly if they at-
tempted to develop evidence about the importance of a case 
several procedural steps before review by a court of last resort. 
For all these reasons, then, the record will generally in-
clude very little information regarding the importance of the 
issue in a wider social context. In order to meet their obliga-
tions under the relevant court rules, the parties are therefore 
required to offer the court new evidence supporting the peti-
tion’s claims of importance.210 This is significant not merely be-
cause it affects the decision on whether to review a case, but 
because such information may carry over into a subsequent 
discussion on the merits.211 This is particularly true when an 
appellate court is presented with a facial challenge to the valid-
ity of a given statute. Such facial challenges necessarily present 
questions regarding legislative meaning and the likely effect of 
a particular law or judicial decision—questions that implicate 
facts reaching well beyond the parties and events connected to 
a specific application of the law.212  
 
 210. Although not as clear an example, a similar consideration is found in 
the collateral order doctrine, which treats certain interlocutory decisions as 
“final” for purposes of an appeal as of right under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See gener-
ally Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546–47 (1949) (an-
nouncing the doctrine); 15A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3911 (2d ed. 1992). Although an appeal 
from a collateral order is not discretionary, in the sense that the Court of Ap-
peals cannot decline jurisdiction in a case where the relevant conditions are 
met, the court of appeals nevertheless remains responsible for determining 
whether those factors are met in the first instance. In making that assess-
ment, at least some courts have concluded that a party must show the “im-
portance” of their case, demonstrating that it is something more than a run-of-
the-mill erroneous decision by the court below. But see 15A CHARLES ALAN 
WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3911.5 
(Supp. 2011) (noting that the “importance” showing under the collateral order 
doctrine has something of a “checkered career”). 
 211. See, e.g., Gorod, supra note 2, at 4–5 (recounting Supreme Court oral 
argument in which Chief Justice John Roberts referenced his independent in-
ternet research when posing questions to counsel).  
 212. For a discussion of statutory facial challenges involving scientific evi-
dence, see Stephanie Tai, Uncertainty About Uncertainty: The Impact of Judi-
cial Decisions on Assessing Scientific Uncertainty, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 671, 
672–73 (2009). “[R]esolutions can be especially complicated where statutory 
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8. Independent Research as a Source of New Evidence 
Perhaps the most common mechanism for the discovery of 
new information on appeal is independent research into issues 
in the case conducted by judges and their staff. As one com-
mentator noted (paraphrasing the findings in Marvell’s study), 
the “judiciary’s current method of absorbing scientific infor-
mation on legislative facts is haphazard, unruly and unreliable. 
One study of appellate litigation reported that forty percent of 
the cited references to the scientific literature came via the 
court’s independent research, unaided by the lawyers or the 
record made in the lower court.”213 
With the advent of the internet and the breadth of infor-
mation available online, judges are not only much more able to 
access legal information, but it is much easier to access infor-
mation that has relevance to a given case—whether that infor-
mation is deemed adjudicative, legislative, or otherwise.214 Giv-
en the pervasiveness of the internet, it would be surprising if 
 
challenges arise facially because the science before the courts can involve leg-
islative facts beyond those concerning the immediate parties in the case.” Id.  
 213. Maurice Rosenberg, Improving the Courts’ Ability to Absorb Scientific 
Information, in SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ADVICE TO THE PRESIDENT, CON-
GRESS, AND JUDICIARY 480, 482 (William T. Golden ed., 1988) (citing 
MARVELL, supra note 16, at 192). 
 214. See generally Richard B. Cappalli, Bringing Internet Information to 
Court: Of “Legislative Facts,” 75 TEMP. L. REV. 99 (2002). While the primary 
issue for this Article is independent research by judges, the problem is, per-
haps, even more significant when it comes to inexperienced jurors who are 
used to seeking out information on the internet. Much has been written on the 
risks presented by independent research by jurors into case information, and 
the scope of appropriate efforts to prevent it. See Daniel W. Bell, Juror Mis-
conduct and the Internet, 38 AM. J. CRIM. L. 81, 83 (2010) (asserting that inci-
dents of unauthorized juror research “have dramatically increased since the 
advent of the Internet”); George L. Blum, Prejudicial Effect of Juror Miscon-
duct Arising from Internet Usage, 48 A.L.R. 6TH 135, 141–44 (2009) (collecting 
cases); Laura W. Lee, Silencing the “Twittering Juror”: The Need to Modernize 
Pattern Cautionary Jury Instructions to Reflect the Realities of the Electronic 
Age, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 181, 186 (2010) (discussing jurors’ problematic use of 
Twitter); Susan Macpherson & Beth Bonora, The Wired Juror, Unplugged, 
TRIAL, Nov. 2010, at 40 (noting the “new challenges” to the modern jury sys-
tem as communication habits change in an increasingly electronic environ-
ment); Caren M. Morrison, Jury 2.0, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1579, 1581 (2011) (not-
ing a growing trend of jurors “conducting unauthorized online research”). It is 
worth considering why the legal system’s rules regarding independent re-
search by jurors is so much stricter than for judges. The answers likely lie in 
(a) an implicit assessment of judicial, as opposed to juror, competence in eval-
uating the quality of legislative facts, and (b) concern that judges may be 
marginally less likely to seek out participation by the parties in the event that 
a factual dispute regarding the relevant information becomes apparent. 
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law clerks in appellate courts did not occasionally inform them-
selves about the basic information in a case by referring to 
Google Maps or Wikipedia. 
Of course, a court is unlikely to stray into independent re-
search of adjudicative facts. The Model Code of Judicial Con-
duct provides that judges “shall not investigate facts in a mat-
ter independently, and shall consider only the evidence 
presented and any facts that may properly be judicially no-
ticed.”215 For this reason, judges are well aware of constraints 
on independent research into adjudicative facts. When it comes 
to legislative facts, however, neither the code, the rules of evi-
dence, nor any other positive law places significant limits on the 
ability of the court to investigate and rely upon such evidence.216 
Courts take advantage of this flexibility. In Singh v. Ash-
croft, for instance, the Ninth Circuit reversed a Board of Immi-
gration Appeals decision rejecting an application for asylum.217 
The applicant alleged that he feared retaliation by a former 
employer, a CIA-like entity within the Indian national govern-
ment called the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW).218 The 
BIA concluded that there was insufficient evidence presented of 
the RAW’s existence, but the Ninth Circuit reversed, stating 
that “[t]he RAW does exist”:219 
The existence and operations of the RAW are readily known by the 
employment of an accessory tool as familiar in legal research today as 
Shephard’s Citations were half a century ago. A simple Lexis search 
reveals over 1,500 articles on the RAW from reputable international 
media sources including the BBC. . . . If this case had involved an 
agent’s claimed membership in an agency more well-known in the 
United States . . . . [this] issue simply would not have arisen because 
the IJ or BIA would have unconsciously taken notice of the fact of 
those agencies’ existence. Judicial notice is appropriate in exactly this 
circumstance—to ensure that administrative or judicial ignorance is 
 
 215. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.9(C) (2007). Neither the 
comments nor the rule define “facts in a matter.” See id. & cmts. 1–7.  
 216. See Thornburg, supra note 5, at 136 (“But they may independently as-
certain and use information that meets the requirements for judicial notice, 
and they may investigate ‘legislative facts’—those that inform the court’s 
judgment when deciding questions of law or policy—to their hearts’ content, 
bound by no rules about sources, reliability, or notice to the parties.”); cf. 
George R. Currie, Appellate Courts Use of Facts Outside of the Record by Re-
sort to Judicial Notice and Independent Investigation, 1960 WIS. L. REV. 39, 39 
(“Whether an appellate court will take judicial notice of a fact on appeal which 
was not noted by the trial court, or called to that court’s attention, rests large-
ly in the discretion of the appellate court.”). 
 217. Singh v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 903, 907 (9th Cir. 2004).  
 218. Id. at 904. 
 219. Id. at 905. 
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not insulated from review through hyper-technical application of the 
general rule that the court can consider only evidence considered by 
the Board.220 
This is not a new issue for the courts. Even before the in-
ternet was so pervasive, there was “no reason to suspect that 
justices, just like other Americans, do not obtain information 
about current events from television, the radio, and newspa-
pers.”221 Professor Davis reports that after his lecture pub-
lished in Minnesota Law Review, he spoke with the Congres-
sional Research Service and learned that “[a] Supreme Court 
law clerk sought CRS assistance in Bowen v. American Hospi-
tal Association . . . and the Court cited a CRS study in footnote 
30, using the names of authors but not mentioning the CRS. 
The record shows no predecision chance for the losing party to 
respond to the study.”222 And it should be no surprise that, af-
ter becoming a Supreme Court Justice, Louis Brandeis “contin-
ued his extensive factual studies and wrote many opinions sat-
urated with facts brought to light through his own 
researches.”223 Independent research has long been a source of 
new evidence on appeal; the internet just makes it that much 
more common. 
While independent research is perhaps the most typical 
way for new evidence to make its way before the appellate 
courts, it is also the mechanism that causes the most con-
cern.224 When new evidence is considered as a result of the 
stipulation of parties (and a flexible appellate court),225 or when 
it is introduced via Brandeis briefs, amicus briefs, or petitions 
for review, the nature of the new evidence is clear. If the par-
ties disagree with a particular conclusion, they can challenge 
 
 220. Id. at 906–07 (emphasis added); see also Baptist Health v. 
BancorpSouth Ins. Servs., Inc., 270 F.R.D. 268, 276 n.5 (N.D. Miss. 2010) (re-
lying on “simple Google and Yahoo! searches . . . [as well as] search-
es . . . performed on both Westlaw.com and Lexis.com” to reveal that infor-
mation claimed as privileged was already in the public domain); Muehlbauer 
v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 05 C 2676, 2009 WL 874511, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 
2009) (finding facts, based on a “simple Google search,” contradicting plain-
tiff ’s argument that public safety required release of defendants’ “confidential” 
documents because the information was already available online).  
 221. Epstein & Knight, supra note 198, at 220. 
 222. Davis, supra note 9, at 18. 
 223. Davis, supra note 19, at 403 (citing Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 
264 U.S. 504, 520 (1924) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). 
 224. See Thornburg, supra note 5, at 132–33 (observing that the rise of the 
Internet has “turned a once-marginal concern into a dilemma that affects 
courts and litigants daily”).  
 225. See supra Part II.B.1. 
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its substance, move to strike the evidence, or seek remand for 
further development of the facts. When the court conducts and 
relies on its own research, however, the new evidence is often 
hidden (unless, as in Belleville, it solicits additional information 
from the parties).226 If it is revealed in the final opinion, it be-
comes known only at the last possible moment in the appellate 
process, forcing parties to either accept the court’s findings or 
request relief via rarely granted motions for reconsideration.227 
Absent great care by the appellate court, reliance on independ-
ent research risks error while undermining the confidence of 
the public and parties in the work of both appellate and trial 
courts.228  
  CONCLUSION   
A. TOWARD AN OPEN AND RATIONAL CONSIDERATION OF NEW 
EVIDENCE ON APPEAL 
Perhaps the most telling characteristic of the use of new 
evidence on appeal is the great unwillingness of courts to con-
front the conflict between their use of new evidence and the 
well-accepted principle of record review.229 The record review 
rule helps to define the very nature of appellate courts and the 
appellate process, and while the courts are apparently willing 
to live with exceptions to the general rule, the exceptions often 
fall prey to internal inconsistencies and suffer from a lack of 
coherence.230 The most common message that flows from the 
case law, then, is that appellate courts do not consider new evi-
 
 226. Cf. Peggy C. Davis, “There Is a Book Out . . .” : An Analysis of Judicial 
Absorption of Legislative Facts, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1539, 1541 (1987) (observ-
ing that current practice affords judges “a dangerous freedom”). 
 227. See GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 201, at 814–15 (“[T]he plain fact is 
that the Supreme Court seldom grants a rehearing of any kind . . . .”); STERN, 
supra note 17, at 441 (noting that “[t]he vast majority” of petitions for rehear-
ing “have no chance of success”); UHLRICH, KESSLER & ANGER, P.C. & SIDLEY 
& AUSTIN, FEDERAL APPELLATE PRACTICE: NINTH CIRCUIT § 9.11 at 624–25 
(2nd ed. 1999) (noting, inter alia, that in 1997, only 16 of 610 petitions for re-
hearing in the Ninth Circuit were granted).  
 228. See Gorod, supra note 2, at 68 (noting that the U.S. legal system’s 
“adversarial myth” demands that “suitable procedures are in place to deal 
with all of the cases in the nation’s court system, those that turn on adjudica-
tive and legislative facts alike,” but that current practice is not always  
sufficient).  
 229. See supra notes 17–20 and accompanying text. 
 230. See supra Part II. 
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dence on appeal.231 As should be clear to the reader by now, 
that message is, in fact, incorrect. Until the courts are willing 
to concede the point, they are unlikely to be willing to conduct a 
comprehensive look at the role that new evidence plays on ap-
peal. It is only through such a review that the courts can pro-
vide a reasoned explanation for what otherwise seems an irre-
solvable conflict between, on one hand, the principle of no new 
evidence on appeal, and the willingness, on the other, to con-
sider such evidence whenever it aids the court in its considera-
tion of the case. Such an inconsistent approach undermines 
confidence in the courts and exposes the appellate courts to 
criticism for acting incoherently. 
This Article’s review of the traditional record review prin-
ciple and the many exceptions to it provides a starting point for 
the comprehensive review that has so far been lacking. There 
are several main points to draw from this review: 
First, appellate courts do consider new evidence on appeal, 
and they do it regularly.232 This is particularly true in the con-
text of legislative facts, though it is also not at all rare even for 
adjudicative facts. 
Second, the traditional rule limiting appellate review to in-
formation provided to the trial court is just that—a tradition.233 
While efficiency and fairness provide good justifications for ad-
hering to the principle in most situations, no fundamental con-
stitutional or statutory principles are undermined by variations 
from the traditional rule against the use of new evidence on 
appeal.234 
 
 231. See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text. 
 232. See supra Part II.  
 233. See supra Part I.B. 
 234. Joan Steinman’s recent article discusses the degree to which the fed-
eral constitution may constrain federal appellate courts’ authority to consider 
new issues on appeal under the federal constitution. Steinman, supra note 22 
(manuscript at 20–24, 84–85). She notes that constitutional “appellate” juris-
diction is imbued with common law principles. Id. at 27. Even if the federal 
constitution imposed limits on the U.S. Supreme Court, however, there is no 
textual constraint on the state courts, and arguably less constraint on the in-
termediate federal appellate courts. Because the principle of record review 
rule is largely a constant across both federal and state courts, the source of the 
rule must substantially be systemic and historical, rather than text-based. 
In certain circumstances, due process considerations may place limits on 
the ability of courts to consider new evidence in the absence of another party’s 
ability to respond. This consideration is more likely to matter in the context of 
adjudicative facts; for legislative facts, parties are often lucky if they are even 
made aware of the use of legislative facts prior to the final decision, let alone 
given an opportunity to respond. Cf. Gorod, supra note 2, at 4–5 (noting lim-
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Third, because there is flexibility in the traditional record 
review principle, exceptions to that rule are not ethically ques-
tionable or legally suspect.235 Rather like the rule itself, the ex-
ceptions have arisen in order to address particular situations in 
which fundamental goals of appellate process are best met by 
allowing the appellate courts to consider new evidence on ap-
peal, rather than insisting on vigorous enforcement of the gen-
eral rule. 
Fourth, because each exception arises out of a different 
procedural situation, the rationale justifying each exception 
should be different, although it should be clearly articulated in 
each case. In particular, the authority of the appellate court to 
consider new evidence should be most sweeping when the new 
evidence is being used to determine issues within the particular 
authority of the appellate court.236  
The most obvious place for appellate courts to clarify that 
new evidence may be necessary is in their consideration of dis-
cretionary petitions for review. Because courts of last resort 
have exclusive authority to determine whether to grant peti-
tions for certiorari (or petitions for review),237 their power to 
consider new evidence that bears on whether to grant those pe-
titions should be quite broad. In this area, the use of new evi-
dence on appeal is both appropriate and consistent with the 
overall purposes of appellate review, and parties and the courts 
would benefit from explicitly noting, whether in rules or other-
wise, that the appellate court anticipates the need to consider 
new evidence on appeal in evaluating these petitions. These 
statements should also establish processes to manage disputes 
regarding the validity of new evidence when it is introduced 
(whether by courts or parties) at a stage in the process that 
does not otherwise permit a response.  
The appellate courts have significant, but not exclusive, 
authority over determinations of subject matter jurisdiction 
and the informative role of amicus briefs, followed closely by 
 
ited opportunity by party to respond at oral argument to new information pre-
sented by Chief Justice Roberts).  
 235. See supra Part II.  
 236. Cf. Steinman, supra note 22 (manuscript at 44) (observing that “the 
occasions on which appellate courts have been inclined to resolve issues that 
the district court did not decide correspond to the appellate courts’ competency 
and role, the efficiencies apparently to be gained, and the justifications for de-
parting from the norm against deciding new issues”). 
 237. SUP. CT. R. 16 (explaining process of disposition of a petition for a writ 
of certiorari).  
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consideration of legislative facts in the exercise of their law-
making authority.238 Appellate courts should be willing to in-
vite the submission of new evidence in these areas, although 
they should tolerate less in the way of disputes between the 
parties before deciding to remand matters to the trial court or 
to altogether exclude the use of new evidence on appeal. 
Least flexible of all the exceptions should be those that 
permit appellate courts to consider disputed—or even unset-
tled—questions of adjudicative fact. Those issues are best left 
to the trial courts and their expertise in fact-finding, although 
in rare cases the benefits of immediate appellate review may 
outweigh the value of leaving fact-finding to the trial courts. 
This spectrum of appellate consideration of new evidence 
on appeal matches, to some degree, existing law. Any explicit 
acknowledgement of the use of new evidence on appeal, howev-
er, would benefit from an explicit association between appellate 
court authority and the exceptions to the traditional rule. 
Fifth, the apparently inconsistent use of exceptions to the 
record review rule does not need to be inconsistent. A decision 
regarding whether to apply an exception should be explained 
not in terms of whether to apply the traditional rule or not, but 
rather as a determination about whether the fundamental 
goals of appellate review are better met by applying the excep-
tion or the default rule. If fundamental concerns about fairness 
are met—i.e., if parties have an opportunity to respond, if there 
is no showing of strategic behavior associated with the belated 
introduction of the new evidence, and if there is enough agree-
ment on the substance of the new evidence (or a possibility of 
resolving it within the procedural constraints of the appellate 
process)—then the exception should be granted. Appellate 
courts must always be willing to recalibrate their use of excep-
tions so that they do not undermine the principles of efficiency 
and fairness that underlie the record review default rule. Nev-
ertheless, by acknowledging both the default rule and the ex-
ception in the same discussion, courts will move toward a more 
candid and, with discussion, an ultimately more coherent ap-
plication of both the record review default rule and the many 
exceptions to that rule.  
Finally, the primary utility of this kind of comprehensive 
evaluation of new evidence on appeal comes from what Peggy 
Davis called the “simple acknowledgement” of the complex 
 
 238. See supra Part II.B.  
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work conducted by appellate courts.239 Although Davis’s effort 
was focused on having appellate courts acknowledge their role 
in the process of lawmaking, her broader point still applies: ap-
pellate court recognition of the fundamental principles under 
which they function—even when those principles may vary 
from traditional understandings about how appellate courts 
should work—effectively forces courts to consider how to en-
gage in discussions that help define and regularize the use of 
those principles. 
By recognizing and accepting their long-standing use of 
new evidence on appeal, appellate courts will take a significant 
step toward a comprehensive understanding of how these ex-
ceptions to the traditional rule fit within the broader work of 
the appellate courts. 
B. NEW EVIDENCE ON APPEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF 
LEGISLATIVE FACTS 
One additional benefit may flow from a generalized effort 
to have appellate courts think about the problem of new evi-
dence on appeal: it will distract attention from the particularly 
vexing problem posed by legislative facts, and may, as a result, 
help to accomplish the very goals that Peggy Davis and other 
commentators articulated in this area some twenty-five years 
ago. 
When she wrote in 1987, Professor Davis noted that “[w]ith 
a few notable exceptions, courts and legislatures have failed or 
refused to regulate the process that has come to be known as 
judicial notice of legislative facts.”240 Her article, as well as the 
contemporary pieces by Kenneth Davis, Robert Keeton, Ann 
Woolhandler, and others,241 called for a level of attention to the 
 
 239. Davis, supra note 226, at 1600–01 (discussing acknowledgment of the 
lawmaking function of the appellate courts). Davis argues that legislative 
factfinding should take place only with certain safeguards: (1) inviting all in-
terested parties to participate in the identification and evaluation of relevant 
legislative facts, (2) acknowledging the legislative function of judges, and (3) 
being attentive to the line between adjudicative and legislative factfinding. Id. 
at 1598–1602; see also Gorod, supra note 2, at 71 (discussing the value of ex-
plicit acknowledgement of judicial use of legislative facts).  
 240. Davis, supra note 226, at 1540; see also id. at 1542 (the “legal en-
shrinement” of legislative facts “is casual and unselfconscious”). 
 241. See Davis, supra note 9, at 17 (proposing that Congress develop a re-
search service for the Supreme Court in response to perceived inadequacies of 
current practice); Keeton, supra note 9, at 44–49 (offering suggestions for im-
proving use of legislative facts by courts); John Monahan & Laurens Walker, 
Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and Establishing Social Science in 
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use of legislative facts, but very little change resulted from 
their call. Federal Rule of Evidence 201 reads as it always has, 
and courts continue to consider new evidence regarding legisla-
tive facts on a regular basis.242 
The work of those scholars may have been lost, in part, be-
cause an honest discussion about legislative facts, and particu-
larly about those facts in the appellate process, requires appel-
late courts to acknowledge two indisputable points that they 
have difficulty acknowledging: that courts make law, and that 
appellate courts regularly consider information beyond the 
scope of the trial court record.243 
By encouraging discussion on the latter point, and focusing 
attention on the appellate process, rather than the more con-
troversial and difficult problem of legislative fact and judicial 
lawmaking, this Article may help “bring along” a coherent ap-
proach to appellate court consideration of legislative facts. Be-
cause most legislative facts are evaluated by appellate courts 
considering new evidence on appeal, attention to the broad pro-
cedural problem may provide the necessary entrée to discussing 
the lingering issue of legislative facts.  
The self-reflection called for by this Article—paying atten-
tion to when the courts are engaged in consideration of new ev-
idence on appeal—is an easier task than the one demanded by 
Peggy Davis: paying attention to when the court is engaged in 
lawmaking, rather than law interpreting. This provides a fur-
ther benefit: To the degree that courts need a warning when 
they are straying into the more creative uses of their lawmak-
ing power, their use of new evidence on appeal provides some-
thing of a canary in the mine. When courts see themselves con-
sidering a wide range of evidence that was not available to the 
trial court, they should recognize that they are veering farther 
away from the straightforward interpretive functions of appel-
 
Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 498 (1986) (observing that the issue of courts’ use 
of “empirical information after it has been obtained—by whatever means—has 
received remarkably little attention”); Woolhandler, supra note 9, at 126 (iden-
tifying the possible pitfalls of a rationalized approach to decision-making in 
the judicial process). Their ranks have been recently joined by Brianne J. 
Gorod. Gorod, supra note 2, at 8 (“Although it is perhaps unsurprising that 
courts sometimes rely on extra-record facts, it is surprising that the phenome-
non has received so little attention . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
 242. See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
 243. Gorod, supra note 2, at 50–51 (noting “existential” difficulty of appel-
late courts acknowledging the use of legislative facts).  
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late courts.244 The point is not to warn appellate courts away, 
but simply to alert them to be particularly cautious about the 
use of the new evidence in order to ensure that (a) parties are 
able to adequately participate in the evaluation of those legisla-
tive facts, and (b) courts increase their level of caution to en-
sure that any independent research into legislative facts is 
done with great care. Taking such care would go far toward ad-
dressing the more significant concerns that commentators have 
noted regarding the use of legislative facts.  
In these ways, the issues of new evidence on appeal may 
help to serve as something of a proxy for the difficult problem of 
how to manage the use of legislative facts. By paying more at-
tention to how they resolve procedural problems, courts may 
end up doing a better job in managing their substantive work 
as well.  
 
 244. As one example of this kind of “legislative fact as judicial warning” 
system, consider a recent draft article in which Lumen Mulligan and Glen 
Staszewski suggest that a need to resolve legislative facts should be a clue 
that certain disputes regarding the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should be 
decided not by the Supreme Court, but by the notice and comment process of 
the Civil Rules Advisory Committee. See Lumen Mulligan & Glen Staszewski, 
The Supreme Court’s Regulation of Civil Procedure: The Lessons of Adminis-
trative Law, 59 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming June 2012), available at http://ssrn 
.com/abstract=1897864. 
